The North Korean Freeze Tactic
|Will US negotiators fall for the NK freeze tactic:
North Korea expressed its readiness Thursday to discuss initial steps of its nuclear disarmament, raising hopes for the first tangible progress at international talks on Pyongyang’s atomic weapons program since they began more than three years ago
“We are prepared to discuss first-stage measures,” the North’s nuclear envoy Kim Kye Gwan said on arriving in Beijing for the six-nation negotiations set to start later Thursday.
Media reports have suggested the North may agree to freeze its main nuclear reactor and allow international inspectors in exchange for energy aid as a starting step to disarm.
But Kim said any moves by North Korea would be determined by the United States’ attitude.
“We are going to make a judgment based on whether the United States will give up its hostile policy and come out toward peaceful coexistence,” he said, adding that Washington was “well-aware” of what it had to do.
This statement from US chief negotiator Christopher Hill is a little comforting:
On arriving at Beijing airport on Wednesday, the chief U.S. delegate Christopher Hill told reporters, “I want to emphasize the real success is we complete the joint statement of 2005” whereby the North agreed to dismantle the program in return for aid and security guarantees. “So we are not going to finish that this week. We will maybe just make a good first step,†he added.
I have said this before and I will say it again, Kim Jong-il has no intention of giving up his nuclear weapons. He developed nuclear weapons in order to appease his military eager to join the prestigious nuclear club and to ensure regime survival. He is using the current six party talks to buy time to perfect his nuclear weapons program. Once Kim Jong-il has successfully created a half dozen nuclear weapons he will be able to fully implement what fellow K-blogger Richardson at DPRK Studies calls Strategic Disengagement. Before strategically disengaging, if Kim can get the US to drop its financial sanctions and return the $24 million dollars frozen in a Macau Bank and any other goodies the US is willing to throw in for a nuclear freeze Kim will take it. Why not when he already possesses the weapons?
That is why I advocate that US negotiators should only accept nothing but verifiable nuclear dismantlement in return for any financial incentives that may be offered. The only way the Kim regime would accept total dismantlement is if they don’t have as much nuclear material or their nuclear program isn’t as advanced everyone thinks. Last year’s low yield nuclear test by North Korea suggests that maybe they don’t have much material to build a nuclear program around. I sure hope someone in the government much smarter than me has figured that one out.
At any rate I’m just getting the feeling that the Bush Administration is eager for the appearance of a foreign policy success and a nuclear freeze by North Korea would appear to be one, when in actuality it would be a defeat if Kim is allowed to keep the weapons he already has. Kim will in one year have gained everything he wanted if this nuclear freeze deal is signed. Kim will have his nuclear weapons which ensure his regime’s survival, his frozen $24 million will be given back, and North Korea will international energy assistance. Don’t forget the over one billion dollars worth of assistance Kim is getting this year from South Korea and his fifth column in South Korea has successfully stopped the USFK transformation in that country. Is it 1994 all over again?
Reading Six-Party-Talks-Tea Leaves…
The watchwords for this installment of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing are “optimism†and “caution.†The North Korean negotiator in Beijing, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan (a.k.a. the “smiling assassin”), has helped perpetuate this: …
But, we have no clue how many nuclear devices NK has or will have by the time any potential deal is struck and put into effect.
Thus, we have no way whatsoever to know if NK has dismantled completely or not, which means it will ALWAYS keep at least a couple of nukes.
A question is whether NK can feel safe enough with a system of strategic ambiguity —- "did we keep a few that work? or not?" —— or if it feels it needs to be more bold and say, "We have them." then later "maybe not" then later "We have them" as it has for the past few years.
If I were NK, and I viewed the rest of the world as I currently do, I would settle for the ambiguity – little hints here – little leaks there —- rather than the more bold, usual NK style of pissing on agreements before they are really dead (completely) by doing something bold like testing a nuke or shooting off an ICBM.
NK's military is going to continue to deteriorate.
But, I doubt its stockpiles of WMDs and artillery would be deteriorating anywhere nearly as much as those elements of the military that require warm bodies and fuel and material.
If that is true, then it will continue to have a very good deterent – enough of a deterent to prevent the US from making very big moves, and the nukes would just be icing on the cake with cherries on top.
And either NK knows now or will learn in the next 10 years that —- with its buried nukes —- and its staying so close to collapse —–
——it will be able to squeeze China and South Korea probably enough to get what it needs to survive.
It is a gamble.
China probably doesn't fear that the WMD and nuke arsenal can really do damage to them if the North begins to implode and decides to take people out with it.
China could probably decided Japan and South Korea and then the US would pay the price of a NK collapse, and that would up set the global and regional economy, but who is to say China wouldn't come out better in the long run with those three competitors being hugely preoccupied with a NK disaster?
Yes, China fears a refugee crisis. Yes, China would not want to lose influence in the northern half of Korea. So, China will probably want to keep NK alive.
But, if any nation in the mix is in a better position should the worst happen, it is China.
And China doesn't like being pushed around or blackmailed.
I think the US should avoid cutting any deal that requires the US to put foward any material aid that is more than a token for initial, real moves by Pyongyang. And we should demand it takes more than NK allowing in a tiny amount of nuke inspectors to inspect just one nuke facility.
We should make NK show a real move to open up – which it won't – and then we should wait for the North to collapse and push it in that direction through some rather unsophisticated covert pressure (pumping info into the North and trying to line up regime traitors as well as grassroots opposition).
It is dangerous.
NK collapsing is dangerous.
But, it is the only solution to secutiry in the region.
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