Heroes of the Korean War: Brigadier General Haydon Boatner

Basic Information

• Name: Haydon Boatner
• Born: October 8, 1900
• Died: August 9, 1994
• Korean War Service: Assistant Division Commander for the 2nd Infantry Division & Commander of the Geoje-do Island POW Camp

Introduction

Sometimes heroism in warfare is not always won on the battlefield. Heroism can also occur in the rear ranks by strong leaders organizing and motivating logistical and support units to operate at full capacity to support the frontline units. Often in warfare the rear logistical units can become to complacent due to their distance from the frontline combat units. This complacency inevitably causes inefficiency that ultimately effects the frontline soldiers. This inefficiency and displacement from combat often causes tension between the frontline and rear echelon units that usually leads to colorful names for the rear troops. This has been a fact throughout the wars America has fought. Frontline soldiers today often call the rear echelon troops Foblins (FOB is a forward operating base). During the Korean War they were known as REMF’s (Rear End Motherfu****s). It was these REMF’s that would lead to one of the most embarrassing incidents of the entire Korean War.

Koje-do is a large island located in the southeast of Korea. It covers some 383 squared kilometers and is the second largest island in Korea only behind Cheju-do Island. The island has much historical significance with it’s links to the legendary Korean Admiral Yi Sun-shin. Today the island serves as a holiday destination for people from Pusan and as the home of the Daewoo ship building industry. However, probably the most infamous incident in the island’s history has to be the Koje Island communist prisoner of war (POW) camp constructed on the island during the Korean War. Long before there was Abu Graib there was Goje Island. What happened at Abu Graib totally and utterly fails in comparison to the incompetence and horror of Goje Island during the Korean War.

During the increasing combat on the Pusan Perimeter the US and allied forces found themselves with increasing numbers of North Korean POWs. It was decided that a camp had to be constructed to house the POWs. Goje Island was chosen as the site because of the fact that it was an island making it difficult to escape and it was far from the front making rescue attempts impossible. Additionally it was away from Pusan thus preventing the vital port in Pusan being clogged due to the amount of POWs held there, if the allies had to withdraw from Korea. The area chosen on the island to build the site a flat valley near the center of island that had access to a seaport to resupply the island from. Hap hazard housing and facilities were constructed on the site and very quickly POWs began to fill the camp. After the successful Inchon Landing Operation the amount of POWs increased greatly as even more North Korean troops were captured by the allies. With the entry of the Chinese into the war the camp continued to fill up well past it’s maximum capacity.

The following facts should give you some idea of how overcrowded the POW camp was. The facts are from March 1952, in the article “Prisoner’s Island: Tension and Tedium Rule Koje’s Barbed-Wire World”. This was an extensive story about life for the prisoners on Koje island off the east coast of South Korea. The story appeared in Vol. 32, Issue Number 13, pages 92 to 98 in the March 31, 1952 issue of LIFE magazine. Here are the facts:

• Koje had 3,000 Prisoners of War under the age of 17
• 170,000 prisoners lived there
• 38,000 of the POWs were Korean civilians pressed into Red armies
• 21,000 were Chinese POW’s
• 111,000 were North Korean POWs of both sexes between the ages of 6 and 63
• 60% of the Chinese POWs were illiterate
• 24% of the Koreans were illiterate
• Messages were sent from compound to compound via dragonflies
• Each arriving prisoner received about $50 worth of GI uniform
• Compound 66 had 2,600 North Korean officers who believed in communism
• 6,000 Koreans and 13,000 Chinese signed anti-Communist petitions, sometimes in blood
• In February of 1952, 69 POWs in Compound 62 died in a riot
• Prisoners of War on Koje studied language, history, manual crafts, modern farming, and the difference between democracy and totalitarianism.

To put the massiveness of these numbers into perspective, Abu Graib never held more than 4,000 prisoners at its peak in 2004.

Overcrowding and Incompetence

The overcrowding combined with an ideological battle within the camp made living conditions increasingly unbearable. The POWs segregated themselves into gangs that either believed in communism or capitalism and even further divided themselves by religion as Christianity was increasingly accepted by the prisoners. The gang like atmosphere in the prison bares a striking similarity to America’s prisons today by how prisoners segregate themselves into gangs based on ethnicity. The different gangs regularly fought for turf and influence in the prison camp.

The guards that secured the compound rarely if ever went inside the compound. Most of them were rear echelon troops bored and uninterested in duty on the island. The prisoners pretty much ran the prison themselves with the American soldiers standing guard outside the wire.

Due to the lax security within the compound the communist block was able to intimidate and crush opposition and when they had accumulated enough strength within the camp, they decided it was time to start waging war against the Americans from within inside the camp as well. They knew they couldn’t begin a conventional fight against the Americans because they would all just eventually be shot and killed. They decided the best way to open up another front against the Americans was to begin a propaganda war from inside the camp. This campaign would have better results than they ever could have imagined.

On the morning of May 7th, 1952, the commander of the communist faction North Korean Colonel Lee Hak-ku requested that the commander of the prison, Brigadier General Francis Dodd urgently come and meet with him for an important reason. BG Dodd had met with COL Lee before and didn’t expect anything unusual from this request. In a well rehearsed and coordinated move COL Lee’s men surrounded the General and his guards and quickly subdued the guards and pushed them out of the compound and grabbed the general and moved him deep within the compound. The prisoners all pulled out their home made weapons and threatened to kill the general if any attempt to enter the compound was made. The seizure of the American general made instant headlines. Americans woke up to headlines of torture and abuse at Goje Island because the prisoners made demands that the US stop torturing, abusing, and starving them if they wanted their commander back. This was of course nonsense but to other nations around the world who didn’t know any better they of course began to wonder, “What the heck are the Americans doing on Goje Island?”

Additionally the communist block had a field day with the propaganda value of the Goje Island uprising. Here is what Pravda in Moscow wrote in response to the uprising:

Koje Island! Again the gloomy shadow of Maideneck (a Nazi extermination camp in Poland) has come upon the world, again the stench of corpses…… the groans of the tortured…… we learn that “civilized” Americans can be yet more inhuman, yet more infamous than the bloody Hitlerites. Dachau was a death camp, Maidenek was a death factory; Koje is a whole island of death. The American hangmen are torturing, tormenting, and killing unarmed people here. They are experimenting with their poisons on them….

This Kind of War
Page 398

To echo the communists claims the Red Cross condemned the treatment of prisoners on Goje Island as well. They condemned the over crowding, violence in the camp, and the lack of food reaching some prisoners because the communist leaders would store the food for themselves and only hand it out to prisoners loyal to their movement. The Red Cross also would not condone any force to put down the uprising and regain control of the camp in order to meet acceptable humanitarian standards. The Red Cross could provide no advice on how to meet acceptable standards, but was quick to criticize the Eighth Army forces guarding the prison for not meeting those standards.

COL Lee had scored a massive propaganda victory by claiming torture and abuse after capturing the general that was repeated and endorsed in newspapers across the globe. He even scored a bigger victory when another General, BG Charles Colson arrived to take charge of the camp and agreed to demands made by the prisoners to stop torture and abuse in exchange for General Dodd. Before releasing Dodd, the North Koreans put him on trial for war crimes and forced him to the statement that Colson had approved earlier.

After the release of General Dodd, General Colson retracted the signed statement made by Dodd, but by agreeing to the demands in the first place it had the effect of legitimizing the North Koreans’ claims of torture and abuse to the world’s media. The global media was having a feeding frenzy over the Goje Island story and it began to directly effect the truce negotiations being waged at Panmunjom. The US military brass was furious at what was going on at Goje Island and at General Colson for agreeing to the prisoner’s demands.

There were problems on Goje Island, but the prisoners were always fed and did what they wanted in the camp.  The biggest problem on the camp was the overcrowding, because no one expanded the camp because everyone thought the war would end any day and all the prisoners would go home. The problems in the camp was not from torture or abuse, but from incompetence of the people running the camp. This incompetence would end once a man named Brigadier General Haydon Boatner.

The New Commander Takes Charge

Brigadier General Haydon Boatner was an old China hand for the US military. He served in China during World War II and spoke fluent Mandarin. He was serving as the assistant division commander of the Second Infantry Division on the frontlines of the Korean War when he went on leave for R&R in Japan. It was while on leave in Japan that he was notified that he was taking over the Geoje Island POW camp. The camp had been commanded by rear echelon troops and the Eighth Army commander General Mark Clark wanted a proven combat leader to fix the mess that the rear echelon commanders had created on Goje Island and General Boatner conveniently on leave in Japan was just the man he needed.

General Boatner soon arrived in Pusan and received a debriefing from General Colson on the situation on Goje Island. While in Pusan he even ran into the recently released General Dodd who was visibly a shaken man after being held hostage and was on his way to Tokyo to report to his superior there over the incident. Dodd would go on to be reduced one rank to colonel and forcibly retired from the military. While meeting with General Colson, Boatner was amazed how oblivious he was to the media frenzy over Goje Island. There was little access to the media in Korea, but in Tokyo the media frenzy in the newspapers could not be missed and Colson would soon find out about the frenzy after meeting with Boatner and returning to Japan where he was also disciplined for his part in the Goje Island mess.

Boatner found the lack of information reaching Korea to be even worse once he arrived on Goje Island. The first thing the command staff on Goje wanted to do once he arrived was to throw him a cocktail party. General Boatner couldn’t believe that the staff on Goje was more concerned about cocktail parties than ending the uprising and the subsequent propaganda beating the US was taking due to the mess on Goje Island. The priorities of the soldiers on Goje Island became only more evident as Boatner looked around the camp. He found soldiers in different uniforms and some soldiers carrying weapons and others not. The reason he found for the lack of weapons was the fear of accidental discharges. For a commander that had fought on Heartbreak Ridge, Boatner could not believe the attitude of the soldiers he found on Goje Island. General Boatner immediately ordered one standard uniform and put everyone under arms to the objection of the staff he inherited. They were an absolute disgrace and he was going to fix it.

Internationalizing the Problem

Boatner discovered that this attitude was allowed to manifest because many of the officers and soldiers that the Army found unfit for combat had been sent to this island instead of the frontlines. General Boatner decided it was time to start a purge to rid the camp of the unfit soldiers and leaders. He relieved over 400 soldiers from the island and now had to replace them. To replace them Eighth Army sent him combat team from the 187th Airborne from Japan, a Canadian company, a British company, a few Greek soldiers, and a Turkish company. The Eighth Army commander General Clark received a lot of criticism from the governments of the soldiers sent to Goje because these countries wanted nothing to do with what was going on with Goje Island. It was a political kryptonite that everyone wanted to steer clear of, but General Clark felt the problem on Goje was a UN problem and not solely a US problem and by sending foreign units there it internationalized the problem.

Expanding the Camp

After General Boatner had successfully conducted his purge and refocused the attention of the camp on regaining control of the prisoners and not holding cocktail parties, he then focused on expanding the camp in order to break up the organized groups of prisoners. Boatner know that he had to expand the compound quickly because the camp was not only making international headlines that were disgracing the country, but was also being used for political fodder during the negotiations at Panmunjom.

One of the most sensitive issues being discussed during the negotiations was the return of POWs at Goje Island. The allies wanted to give the prisoners an option of either staying in South Korea or returning to North Korea or China. The Chinese and North Korean negotiators wanted all the prisoners sent back to North Korea and China. When challenged that many of the prisoners wanted to stay in South Korea the communist negotiators would counter that the prisoners only say that because they are being inhumanely tortured on the island and would hold up western media reports that had sensationalized what was going on at Goje Island to prove it. Additionally images of the daily protests at the Goje camp complete with prisoners chanting communist slogans and holding up pictures of Marxist leaders were filling the daily newspapers across the globe feeding the perception of torture, abuse, and the fact that all the prisoners wanted to be returned to North Korea and China.

An engineer unit was sent to Goje to help expand the camp. Initially the engineer commander was more concerned about building a new PX for the soldiers than expanding the camp, but General Boatner set him straight and ordered his men to work 24 hours a day building the new barracks to house the prisoners. The PX could wait.

Breaking the Enemy’s Will

Along with Boatner’s efforts to restore discipline in his troops and expand the camp he also needed to break the will of the enemy. Boatner felt that since the prisoners’ commander North Korean Colonel Lee Hak-ku had successfully brought massive media attention on the island that at anytime he could order his men to attempt a massive prison break that would end in the deaths of many prisoners further causing disgrace to the US military and the condemnation of the world. Boatner had to work on breaking up the loyalty of the prisoners to Colonel Lee.

The prisoners would challenge General Boatner’s authority on just his second day on the job. A Chinese faction of soldiers loyal to Colonel Lee began to cause a commotion in the camp. General Boatner went to the camp to see what was going on. He was amazed to see 6,500 Chinese soldiers in perfect formation chanting slogans and holding propaganda signs. Outside the wire the American soldiers were gathered hooting and hollering back at the Chinese. It was a chaotic scene that Boatner was quick to get control of. He ordered his aid to bring the commander of the US soldiers to him and the Chinese commander. Boatner proceeded to scald the US commander to take control of his men. The commander, a lieutenant colonel had served under General Boatner on the frontlines of the war and quickly responded and got control of his men and stopped the hollering at the Chinese.

Boatner than turned his attention to the Chinese commander who was a colonel in the Chinese Army that spoke a northern Chinese accent that Boatner understood completely. The colonel not realizing Boatner could speak Chinese brought an interpreter with him that reiterated demands about the Geneva Convention, Panmunjom, and the usual communist talking points of the day. General Boatner, to the Chinese commander’s shock, responded in perfect Mandarin that he was full of crap and then proceeded to tell him the names of respected Chinese generals he had fought with during World War II. The fact that he could speak Mandarin combined with his association with prominent Chinese commanders impressed the Chinese commander. The Chinese commander agreed to end the protest and through small acts of Chinese cultural understanding over the proceeding days Boatner was able to win the respect of the Chinese commander. In just a few short days General Boatner had already eroded support for Colonel Lee Hak-ku’s uprising in the prison.

Next Boatner turned his attention to eliminating the communist propaganda such as signs and statues that had been erected around the camp. Boatner wanted to avoid one large operation that the prisoners could organize against and cause a massive incident that could turn into blood shed which would be reported around the world. Boatner decided instead to use well timed raids that featured tanks backed with soldiers trained in riot control. Boatner’s men raided one compound at a time over a series of days to slowly destroy all the propaganda around the camp thus avoiding one large operation. Slowly but surely General Boatner was able to eliminate the communist propaganda inside the camp. In the first week of Boatner’s command it was clear to all the prisoners that there was a new boss in town and it wasn’t Colonel Lee Hak-ku.

Isolating the Prisoners

It was long known that villagers outside of the Goje POW camp were helping the prisoners inside the camp with supplies and the sending of messages back to their masters in North Korea and in turn influencing the on going negotiations at Panmunjom. Many of the villagers on Goje were actually North Korean civilians relocated from Wonsan and Hangnum in North Korea. Among the evacuated civilians were many North Korean agents that were aiding the prisoners in the camp. General Boatner knew he had to stop this rat line running from Goje to Panmunjom and the only way to do that would be by forcibly moving thousands of villagers away from the camp.

The problem with doing that was that with the Red Cross and media hanging around would condemn such an act. However, the problem with the civilians supporting the prisoners got so bad that Boatner had to do something about them before he could move on fully ending the uprising in the prison. Boatner sent trucks to the village to move the villagers. The military in two days was able to move the entire village and burn the huts down. It brought some bad headlines in the short term, but in long term it totally isolated the North Korean leadership within the prison.

Ending the Revolt

It took 30 days for the engineers to complete the expansion of the prison and during this time General Boatner was able to restore discipline among his own troops, divide loyalties within the prison, and end the rat line of communications from and to the prison. The last thing that had to be done was to end the revolt and restore order.

With the new camp constructed the time was now here to begin moving prisoners into the new and more secure compound. There was tens of thousands of prisoners total on Goje divided in separate camps of 6,500 prisoners. General Boatner chose the most violent camp with the head communist leadership, including Colonel Lee Hak-ku in Camp 76 to begin the movement of the prisoners from. Boatner felt that by crushing opposition here first, it would set an example to the rest of the prisoners. Using crack paratroopers from the 187th Airborne Brigade, Boatner had his men completely surround Camp 76. The men were under very explicit orders to use non-lethal means to move the prisoners and could only shoot to kill with the permission of the commanding officer only. It was imperative that the operation didn’t turn into a blood bath for the world’s media to report. The paratroopers had trained for weeks for this operation and were ready to put down the uprising by chopping off it’s head at Camp 76.

All at once on June 10th, 1952, the soldiers cut down the wire around the camp and moved in. The paratroopers moved in slowly and deliberately subduing prisoners. As they moved further into the camp the prisoners set fire to the buildings creating a smoke screen to fight the paratroopers in. The paratroopers began throwing concussion grenades into the smoke which had the effect of breaking up the frontlines of the resistance. As prisoners fled the impact of the grenades they were quickly captured by the paratroopers. The last 150 holdouts made one last ditch effort to fight off the paratroopers by hunkering down in trenches they had dug. As the paratroopers closed in on the trenches some of the prisoners panicked and ran towards the paratroopers to give themselves up. However, as they ran from the trenches the hard core communist cadre chased after them and killed some of the defectors. The paratroopers quickly moved in to stop the slaughter and a melee ensued.  You can watch historic video footage of the operation at this link.

Once the operation was over 43 POWs had been killed and 135 wounded with half these casualties coming from the communists attacking their own people. Only one paratrooper who had been speared to death was killed in the operation. The paratroopers searched through the compound and found corpses hanging from inside the buildings to serve as an example to anyone that did not resist the Americans. They also found detailed plans by the communist to conduct a mass prison break on June 20th and slaughter anyone in there path in order to make maximum headlines against the Americans.

Outside the paratroopers found Colonel Lee hiding in a ditch and dragged him to his new compound. The leader of the communist uprising had gone down without a fight. The 6,500 prisoners in the notorious Camp 76 had been broken down and moved to the new compound and divided into more secure compounds of 500 prisoners per camp. The smaller number of prisoners per camp made it harder for them to organize and easier for the guards to manage. After this operation the rest of Goje’s prisoners voluntarily moved without confrontation to the new camp. By June 12th all the prisoners had been moved and General Boatner was firmly in charge of Goje Island. Colonel Lee and the rest of the prisoners of the Goje POW camp would never give General Boatner and his successors anymore problems for the rest of the war

Lessons Learned from the Geoje Island Incident

The US forces during the Korean War had been completely unprepared for the detaining of massive amounts of enemy prisoners. During World War II the US military dealt with few prisoners because very few Japanese ever surrendered. In the European theatre the allies didn’t start taking massive amounts of German prisoners until the war was just about over and the Germans had lost their will to fight. During the Korean War the US had taken massive amounts of prisoners and the enemy was far from being vanquished. Additionally these prisoners came from an alien culture and ideology that US commanders understood little about. Enemy prisoners looked at using prison as just another front in their war against the US and its allies.

To compound the problem the US commanders were so consumed with fighting the immediate war little emphasis was put into the handling of prisoners and possible propaganda value to the enemy for any mistreatment. Additionally the assigning of poor soldiers and officers to manage the prisoners combined with the inadequate facilities to house the prisoners would lead to strategic consequences later in the war.

The mistakes made during the Korean War in the handling of prisoners would repeat itself to a much smaller degree during Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Abu Graib prison abuse controversy, but the propaganda value was just as valuable to not just the immediate enemy, but all the interests opposed to America in general as well.

Here are some of the big lessons learned I think the military can take away from these two very big historical blights on the image of the US military in the last 50 years.  First of all, plans need to be made to house prisoners before going to war. Before the war even started there should have been an engineer unit designated to immediately begin building a compound to house prisoners. The Korean War was an unexpected war, but the Iraq War had plenty of prior planning and unfortunately the prior planning did little to plan for the amount of prisoners the US would end up holding. One engineer company during the Korean War built a camp to hold tens of thousands of prisoners in one month. What if the US military built a camp of similar size in the desert some where in Iraq to hold prisoners instead of Abu Graib? This would have easily prevented the overcrowding of the prison.

Secondly, Abu Graib should have never been chosen as a place to hold prisoners to begin with due to its notorious image from the Saddam Hussein era of power in Iraq. What if during the Korean War the US military started holding prisoners within Soedaemun Prison in Seoul? What kind of message would that have sent to the general Korean population during the war? During the Korean War Goeje Island was actually a well chosen location for a prison that planners during the Iraq War could have learned a lot from.

Next thing is that a mission as politically sensitive as handling prisoners of war at a detention facility should be handled by only highly professional soldiers. Who in the world thought it was a good idea to have people like Charles Graner and Lynndie England to have such authority over prisoners? Janice Karpinski was just a female version of Francis Dodd. Abu Graib was surrounded by just as much incompetence as Goje Island during the Korean War. It wasn’t until competent leadership backed by crack troops were conditions in the camp able to improve on Goje Island. The lesson learned is that highly professional units with excellent leadership that deal exclusively with handling prisoners of war should be formed before a war is even initiated. The adhoc nature of soldiers and agencies thrown together in Abu Graib caused an environment ripe for abuse.

Finally, internationalizing the Goje prison by General Boatner was a brilliant idea because it shares responsibility for anything that happens within the prison. The international media glee over Abu Graib would probably have been much more tempered if more countries were involved in the management of the prison. This is something that should become a standard practice in future conflicts.

These were all painful lessons learned in the aftermath of the Goje Island Incident that would unfortunately be forgotten 50 years later in Iraq. Military planning requires more than just maneuvering infantry and tanks and hopefully in future conflicts the US military properly plans to deal with the handling of prisoners of war. Especially when such an issue can have such strategic impact, which in the case of Abu Graib is still being felt today. The painful lessons learned from Abu Graib could have been avoided with a close study and appreciation of the experiences of General Haydon Boatner on Goeje Island.

Next Posting: Goje POW Camp Today

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