Should President Trump Let North Korea Keep A Regional Nuclear Strike Capability?

That is what this article in the Politico suggests that President Trump is planning to do:

Taking Trump at his word during the campaign—when he decried U.S. allies Japan and South Korea as ungrateful free-riders—it would be reasonable to conclude that Trump is willing to forsake U.S. allies in the region by getting Kim to agree to negotiate away his ICBMs but ultimately leave Kim with a regional nuclear strike capability. Nuclear scholars have worried that a North Korean ICBM capability would “decouple” the United States from South Korea—the question of whether America would trade Seattle for Seoul in a nuclear conflict is a rhetorical one. We know the answer. The irony of a nuclear deal between Kim and Trump may actually be that true decoupling will happen when North Korea retains only the ability to strike U.S. allies but not the United States. Kim can simultaneously give a nod in the direction of denuclearization, remove the imminent threat to the U.S. homeland posed by his ICBMs, and expand a wedge between the United States and its allies.  [Politico]

You can read more at the link, but considering that President Trump has stressed denuclearization repeatedly he would have a hard time agreeing to allowing North Korea to keep nuclear weapons that they can use to strike an ally like Japan and US bases in the region.