New Book Describes Friction Between Trump and Moon Administrations Over North Korea Policy

In a new book written by H.R. McMaster he discusses his time working in the Trump administration and the friction with the Moon administration over the North Korea nuclear issue:

In the book, titled, “At War with Ourselves: My Tour of Duty in the Trump White House,” H.R. McMaster, who served as national security advisor from 2017-2018, revealed a series of anecdotes where the administrations of former Presidents Moon Jae-in and Donald Trump diverged on North Korea and other issues. (……..)

“Moon said that, just like Saddam Hussein and Muammar Khadafi, Kim believed that he needed nuclear weapons for defense,” McMaster wrote.

“Pence asked Moon, ‘Why does Kim Jong-un need nukes when he has conventional artillery in range of Seoul? We have to consider the possibility that Kim wants the weapons for offensive purposes,'” he added.

Yonhap

Why can’t it be both? Clearly Kim saw what happened to Khadafi and Saddam and does not want that to happen to him. His conventional artillery is enough to deter the ROK and the U.S. as long as USFK is in South Korea. However, if USFK is ever withdrawn that then gives the U.S. more flexibility to strike North Korea without fear of instant retaliation against U.S. troops.

Nucelar weapons combined with their missile program are clearly aimed to deter the U.S. by threatening to launch nuclear weapons against bases in Japan, Guam, and eventually the U.S. mainland if they develop a reliable ICBM. This is why the Kim regime has been wanting to sign a peace agreement with the U.S. during the Moon administration. If there is peace why is USFK still needed? North Korea strategy is to get USFK out and then deter the U.S. with nuclear weapons.

If North Korea feels the U.S. is deterred then tactical nukes could then be used during any offensive operation into South Korea. However, I believe this would actually be a last option for the Kim regime. During the Moon administration the Kim regime was trying to push a confederation policy with South Korea that ultimately failed, but would not be surprised if it came up again in the future.