Heroes of the Korean War: Major General William Dean – Part 2
Kum River Defense
After the withdrawal south of the Kum River and the destruction of the bridges across it, the US21st regiment now found itself with a total of only 325 men between the two battalions that composed the regiment to face the approximately 20,000 NKPA soldiers bearing down on them on the opposite bank of the river. MG Dean decided to move up the 19th Infantry regiment from Taejon and what was left of the 34th Regiment from their earlier fight in Choenan to reinforce the 21st. With the addition of the 19th and the 34th roughly 4,300 men were now in defensive positions south of the Kum River while the men of 21st took up a reserve positions behind the other two regiments, to face the two advancing North Korean divisions supported by 50 tanks. Total combat power of the division stood at 11,000 men and the US24th Division had already lost roughly 1,800 men and many more would be lost before this battle was over.
The US34th manned the left flank of the Kum River defense. It is important to keep in mind that the US34th’s combat power was greatly diminished after their defeat and withdrawal from both Pyeongtaek and Choenan. The regiment was short of personnel, weapons, and equipment. The equipment they were most short on was radios, which would ultimately play a key role in the failure of the Kum River defense. L company of the US34th was on the farthest left flank of the US defensive line. The company commander had no communications with anyone, which means he had no situational awareness of the overall battle plan. The North Koreans began shelling L company’s position and began their river crossing operation. Seeing the overwhelming North Korean unit approaching and not knowing where the other US units were the commander decided to withdraw his unit all the way back to the battalion headquarters. The commander was relieved on the spot by the battalion commander for leaving his position and allowing the North Koreans to cross the river. Keep in mind that this commander had been withdrawing since his unit first made contact with the North Koreans back in Pyeongtaek. Withdrawing had become a natural reaction to an overwhelming North Korean attack. Retreat had become contagious and L company wasn’t the only ones doing it. Ultimately the entire US34th regiment withdrew leaving the US19th to face the two North Korean divisions by themselves.
Before the North Koreans began any operations on the US19th regiment, their scouts had located the positions of the US field artillery positions located to the rear of the US19th. The North Korean infantry simply crossed the river where the US34th had withdrawn and walked around and to the rear of the US19th to destroy the field artillery locations. The US field artillery were really the only guns capable of stopping the North Korean armor. In one quick attack the North Koreans were able to destroy a battalion of US field artillery and further limit their already desperate ability to destroy NKPA armor.
However, the US19th continued a rugged defense against the NKPA infantry which had crossed the Kum and was eventually able to repel them, while US air power was able to inflict heavy damage on enemy tanks trying to forge the Kum River. Amazingly the US regiment held off two North Korean divisions and even inflicted heavy casualties on them while doing so. For the entire day of July 15th things were actually looking up. However, it wouldn’t last, things would change quite drastically that night.
The North Koreans realized the amount of casaulties from US air strikes during the day made night operations an absolute must. In the early morning hours of July 16th at 0300, all hell broke loose on the Kum River. The North Koreans through everything they had at the US19th across the Kum River. Every element including the regimental command post found themselves under attack sustained enemy attack. Colonel Winstead the commander of the US19th organized a counterattack force of his unit’s clerks, supply personnel, cooks, and staff officers. The counterattack was actually successful at driving a large formation of North Korean infantry back across the river, but both the regiment’s key officers the adjuntant and operations officers were killed leading the counterattack force.
US Soldiers Battle the North Koreans Along the Kum River North of Taejon
The death of officers, particularly senior officers, in the early weeks of the Korean War was a reoccurring theme due to the lack of communications which caused senior officers to personally organize and lead attacks instead of giving commands over the radio to subordinates. This would phenomenom would have a cumulative effect, as unit’s lost their key leaders, discipline of the troops dropped, which contributed to the tendency to instantly retreat once confronted by the enemy. An old axiom says that leaders lead from the front; no where was that more true than the early weeks of the Korean War.
Even though the counterattack caused a large formation of the North Koreans to retreat, many others were able to infiltrate into the regiment’s rear areas and set up road blocks to prevent the resupply of the regiment. Many of the North Koreans setting up these road blocks had infiltrated dressed in the white clothes of South Korean refugees. Supply personnel located in these rear areas were not to keen about mounting any counterattack against the North Korean road blocks.
By late afternoon the regiment was given orders to withdraw, but the roadblocks prevented most of the US units from withdrawing with their vehicles. With many of the regiment’s officers dead, a majority of the US soldiers simply decided to retreat cross country and left all their vehicles where they were at instead of fighting their way through the road blocks. Some made out of the Kum River defense and others didn’t. In fact retreating soldiers straggled into Taejon all that night and the next morning including COL Winstead who was severely wounded and exhausted from the sustained fighting of the Kum River defense. On the morning of July 17th less than half of the US19th regiment had made it back to Taejon. The rest were either dead, captured, or missing.
MG Dean now had three regiments that were actually only regiments in name only. The US21st regiment was depleted from the Taskforce Smith battle at Osan and the hill defense north of the Kum River, while the US34th regiment was smashed at Pyeongtaek and Choenan, and the US19th regiment was now less than half strength from trying to hold the Kum River. MG Dean wanted to withdraw the 24th Division from Taejon, but LTG Walker flew up to Taejon and in a face to face meeting told MG Dean the 24ID had to keep delaying the North Korean advance at Taejon because the follow on US forces had not arrived in theatre yet to defend the Naktong River line. The US forces were literally looking at being pushed into the sea if the 24ID didn’t hold on.
MG Dean understood what LTG Walker ordered was essentially suicide for him and his men, but he obeyed the order and what was left of the 24ID prepared to try and hold Taejon. The fate of the entire Korean War would fall on the shoulders of these few determined men.
Next Posting: The Fall of Taejon
Prior Posting: General William Dean – Part 1
