Tag: Andrei Lankov

Andrei Lankov On Why North Korean and Chinese Relations “Is Business as Usual”

ROK Drop favorite Andrei Lankov has an opinion piece in the Korea Times that explains how China’s supposed harsh line with North Korea was merely a short term fluctuation and things are back to normal between the two countries:

For a brief while, South Korean diplomats were in a rather celebratory mood: it looked like China, for a change, had joined the ROK and the U.S. in their efforts to subject North Korea to the toughest sanctions ever. Indeed, in early March the Chinese representative in the U.N. Security Council voted for Resolution 2270 which introduced such measures, and for a while the united front looked like a reality.

Frankly, for yours truly, it was a surprise: the harsh position Beijing had seemingly committed itself to was unprecedented, and China’s switch happened quite suddenly. However, now it seems that this change was merely a short-term fluctuation.

There are many signs of a warming of relations between China and North Korea. In early June, Ri Su-yong, the former North Korean foreign minister who currently is the Korean Workers’ Party vice-chairman responsible for foreign relations, visited Beijing. It is the first time since 2013 that a North Korean official of such high rank has appeared in the Chinese capital. Among other things, Ri was granted an audience with President Xi Jinping. It lasted merely 20 minutes and therefore was, first and foremost, a formality, but it still had much symbolic meaning. It is equally important that the Chinese media devoted much space to describing the visit.

Simultaneously, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman expressed dissatisfaction with the new U.S. policy initiative ― unilateral sanctions, targeting banks that deal with North Korea. On the other hand, the U.S. authorities subpoenaed Huawei, a massive Chinese telecommunication company, for its alleged deals with North Korea. There is also a growing body of evidence that China is not being as strict with sanctions’ enforcement as many had hoped for.

There is nothing surprising about all this. Like it or not, when it comes to the Korean Peninsula, Chinese interests are seriously different from those of the United States.  [Korea Times]

You can read the rest at the link, but like I have always said China is never going to take a position that would risk the stability of the Kim regime.  As bad as the regime is, to the Chinese government it is better than the alternative of regime collapse and the unification of the peninsula under South Korean rule backed with US troops.

What Gaddafi and Ukraine Teaches Us About North Korea’s Nuclear Program

ROK Drop favorite Andrei Lankov writes about why what happened in Libya and Ukraine is all the justification the Kim regime needs in regards to why they need nuclear weapons:

nk flag

If the sanctions are enforced systematically, North Korea would suffer a major blow. Its economy, which began to recover in recent years, is likely to shrink again and its living standards will certainly go down.

It is the inevitable outcome when half the country’s export earnings evaporate overnight. This encourages supporters of sanctions who believe that these unprecedented measures will push North Korea to the negotiating table and may even lead to the end of North Korea’s nuclear programme.

Unfortunately, these expectations are unfounded. The North Korean ruling elite believe that the country needs nuclear weapons to counter foreign threats, and they remember well the sorry end of Muammar Gaddafi, the only strongman who agreed to surrender his nuclear programme.

Nor do they forget what happened to Ukraine, a country which, in 1994, was given international guarantees over its territorial integrity as a reward for its willingness not to retain Soviet-era nuclear weapons.

At the same time, short of an armed rebellion, the North Korean public had virtually no way to influence government policy – after all, this is the country which since the late 1950s claims 100 percent support for government-appointed candidates at all elections.  [Al Jazeera]

I recommend reading the whole thing at the link.

Andrei Lankov Explains How Surveillance and Indoctrination Works In North Korea

A ROK Drop favorite Dr. Andrei Lankov has an article published that discusses how the Kim regime prevents dissent within North Korea:

However, terror alone does not explain the remarkable staying power of the regime in Pyongyang. The presence and role of daily surveillance must not be underestimated. North Koreans have good reason to believe that even a minor deviation from the officially approved political line will be noticed and punished by the authorities. Punishment, like the misdemeanour itself, might be quite mild. However, it is the ubiquity of surveillance which is important.  (……)

Perhaps, one should first mention the neighbourhood watch groups, known as the inminban (literally, people’s group). Each inminban consists of 15-30 families living side-by-side in a village, urban block, or multi-story building. Such a group is headed by a junior official, whose task is to look for all suspicious activities within her (this is always a woman’s job) jurisdiction. She is also charged with the registration of overnight visitors because one cannot stay overnight even with friends or relatives without giving prior notice to the authorities. The official is required to have intimate knowledge of all families under her jurisdictions: their occupation, income level, family relations and even work routine. At their briefings with police, the inminban heads have always been reminded that they should know “how many chopsticks are in any given household” – and this oft-repeated sentence is not a joke.

Another responsibility of the “people’s group” and its head is to ensure that no forbidden items are kept in private houses. The list of such items includes, above all, tunable radio sets and DVDs of South Korean as well as some Western movies.  [Aljazeera]

You can read the rest at the link, but Dr. Lankov also discusses how the regime uses indoctrination as a means of political control.  There is really nothing new in Dr. Lankov’s analysis for people who closely follow North Korea, but it should make for interesting reading for those who do not.  On this topic I highly recommend reading Babara Demick’s book, “Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea” which goes into great detail through interviews of North Korean defectors how the caste system, inminban, and indoctrination systems work.