Over at The DMZ War there is a very interesting document posted that is a transcript of a 1976 phone conversation between Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. Kissinger and Scowcroft talk about a lot of interesting things in regards to the US response to the killing of two US Army officers during the DMZ Axe Murder Incident. For example Kissinger believed that the North Korean barracks inside of the Joint Security Area (JSA) should have been bombed. Something else I did not know was that the two officers killed in the attack had their bodies shipped home in coffins made from the wood of the tree that was chopped down:
You can read the rest of the transcript at this link.
Via a reader tip comes a link to this State Department document from the minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting on August 18, 1976 after Washington policy makers became aware of the DMZ Axe Murder Incident. The document show the internal deliberations that Secretary State Henry Kissinger had with his staff, the Department of Defense, and the CIA in regards to formulating a response to the murders of two US Army officers by the North Koreans. Here is an excerpt from the document:
Secretary Kissinger: Well there are two problems as I see it. The first problem is that two American officers have been beaten to death. The second problem is to review the procedures we are following in the DMZ. Now, regarding the first issue, I agree with the CIA analysis. My impression is that it was a premeditated attack. There were some fifty other things they could have done to stop us from pruning the tree.
Now this letter Stilwell wants to send to Kim. Why should he send a letter to Kim? What standing does he have?
Mr. Habib: Well Stilwell is the Commander of the UN Forces and Kim is the Commander of the North Korean Army. Kim also signed the original peace agreement.
Secretary Kissinger: There have already been White House and State Department statements deploring these murders. Why do we now also need a Stilwell statement? Does he have the authority to make a statement?
Mr. Abramowitz: No. He needs Washington approval.
Secretary Kissinger: Well lets put that in abeyance. I have talked to the President today about this. He feels that some sort of strong action is necessary but does not know precisely what it should be. Now there are two things that come to my mind. A few weeks ago we turned off a B-52 exercise because it would be provocative to the Chinese. We might resurrect that exercise. The second possibility would be to alert all forces in Korea.
Adm. Holloway: We could go from DEFCON 4 to DEFCON 3.
Secretary Kissinger: What would that do?
Adm. Holloway: Unless we had a specific plan in mind or the North Koreans felt we had a specific plan in mind they probably would not react at all.
Secretary Kissinger: Well on that basis you could not threaten anything.
Mr. Abramowitz: Stilwell recommends that we finish pruning the tree.
Mr. Clements: I am in complete accord with that and think we should cut the God damn thing down.
Secretary Kissinger: I am in favor of that too but I don’t think we should do anything about the tree until after we do something with our forces. What is the meaning of the DEFCON alert stages?
Adm. Holloway: 5 is normal and 1 is war. Stage 2 means that war is inevitable and stage 1 is when the shooting starts.
Mrs. Colbert: If the alert were moved up to 3 how would the media and the U.S. people react to that in this campaign year.
Secretary Kissinger: That has nothing to do with it. The important thing is that they beat two Americans to death and must pay the price.
Mrs. Colbert: The North Koreans are looking for indications that they can create another Vietnam type mentality in this country. Therefore to disabuse them of this it is important to have the right kinds of expressions of support from the media and opinion makers.
Secretary Kissinger: What about resurrecting the B-52 exercise? The State Department hereby withdraws its objections to it. This is tow the best time in the world to run it.
Mr. Habib: It was a training exercise.
Mr. Abramowitz: Would it scare the Americans or the Koreans?
Mr. Gleysteen: There is another exercise planned.
Secretary Kissinger: But everybody already knows about that one.
Mr. Clements: Is it true that in the exercise we would fly the B-52s over Korea and then go back?
Adm. Holloway: Yes.
Secretary Kissinger: How long would it take?
Lt. Gen. Smith: We could get it going in 72 hours possibly less.
You can read much more at the link, but all these deliberations led to Operation Paul Bunyan where the tree was cut down backed by massive US firepower in case the North Koreans tried to retaliate. What else is interesting is that deploying B-52’s and other bombers is still something the US government does to this day to send a message to the North Koreans.
