Tag: Korea

Once again I ask why is the Korean taxpayer being asked to pay for this while Chonghaejin Corp. was fined less than $10,000.

South Korea announced plans Wednesday to salvage the ferry that sunk off the country’s southwest coast a year earlier, claiming 304 lives.

The retrieval will likely begin in September and take up to 18 months, the Ministry of Public Safety and Security said after a meeting of the relevant government agencies.

After making a sharp turn, the 6,825-ton ferry Sewol capsized off Jindo Island on April 16 last year en route to the southern resort island of Jeju from Incheon, west of Seoul.

Most of the victims were teenage students on a field trip, with nine bodies still missing.

President Park Geun-hye Thursday vowed to raise the sunken ferry as soon as possible and to take all measures to recover the bodies of the victims who remain missing.

Some of the families of the victims, however, insisted that the government immediately come up with plans for the salvage of the wreckage.

Thousands of demonstrators staged a violent rally at Seoul Plaza in front of Seoul City Hall Saturday after a ceremony to mark the first anniversary of the Sewol sinking, leaving scores of police officers injured. Police rounded up more than 100 violent demonstrators.

In a news conference, Public Safety Minister Park In-yong said priority will be given to preventing the loss of the bodies of the nine people still missing and minimizing any possible damage to the hull.

As the bodies of the missing people are believed to be inside the hull, the vessel will be lifted from the sea bottom without changing its current position, according to the ministry.

The main part of the recovery will involve divers drilling scores of holes into the hull that’s lying on its left side and chaining it to two cranes that will pull the vessel out of the sea, the ministry noted.

About 100 divers will likely be employed for the underwater work, according to experts.

Up to 150 billion won, or about $139 million, will likely be required for the recovery, although the cost could increase further if the project is delayed or any unexpected technical issues arise.

Still, the retrieval also has safety risks and uncertainties, including the possible destruction of the 20-year-old vessel, typhoons in the summer and a strong current in the shipwreck’s location, Park said.  [Korea Times]

You can read the rest at the link.

Here we go again with arguing over remorse and apologies by Japan in the Korean media:

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has expressed Japan’s “deep remorse” over World War II, but did not issue a fresh apology to the people of Asia.

Abe delivered a speech on Wednesday on the first day of the two-day Asian-African summit in Indonesia marking the 60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference.

Referring to the principles of peace laid down at the original conference, Abe said in his speech that “With feelings of deep remorse over the past war, Japan made a pledge to remain a nation always adhering to those very principles.”

However, Abe did not offer an apology to the people of Asian countries who suffered under Japan’s colonial rule and aggression.  [KBS World]

Well at least KBS didn’t make a claim about Japanese never apologizing for their past World War II actions.  Instead they are upset their wasn’t a fresh apology.  This is actually progress.  I think Abe is just playing to the sentiment of the Japanese public now that is probably hit apology fatigue with all the demands for more apologies after their government has already made a number of apologies. Really the only thing that would make the critics in Korea happy is if a wrecking ball took out the Yasukuni Shrine, Japanese textbooks were burned (even if the information is accurate), and Abe commits seppuku on top of Namsan. Since that isn’t going to happen we will be hearing about this for years to come.

https://twitter.com/SouthKoreaDaily/status/590246725144588288

Plenty of veterans of Korea have left comments here on the ROK Drop about their experiences while stationed in Korea.  However, one camp seems to continuously have very fond memories about it and that is Camp Page in Chuncheon:

That is why I have decided to create a “Profile” dedicated just to Camp Page.  I was never stationed on Camp Page so it was interesting to research and learn more about this camp that many have told me was the best kept secret in Korea.  Camp Page was one of the oldest facilities in USFK before it was closed down since construction of the runaway occurred back in 1951 when the city was recaptured from the Chinese and North Koreans. Here is a picture of the old K-47 airfield from Dave Kowalsky’s website:

However, the airfield was not called Camp Page until 1958 when the 100th Field Artillery Rocket Battalion arrived from Japan. The name of the camp is in honor of US Army Lieutenant Colonel John U.D. Page who was posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor and the Navy Cross for Gallantry for combat heroics while serving with US Marine Corps units during the Chosin Reservoir Campaign. LTC Page died after only being in country 12 days.

Here is LTC Page’s Medal of Honor citation:

Lt. Col. Page, a member of X Corps Artillery, distinguished himself by conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action above and beyond the call of duty in a series of exploits. On 29 November, Lt. Col. Page left X Corps Headquarters at Hamhung with the mission of establishing traffic control on the main supply route to 1st Marine Division positions and those of some Army elements on the Chosin Reservoir plateau. Having completed his mission Lt. Col. Page was free to return to the safety of Hamhung but chose to remain on the plateau to aid an isolated signal station, thus being cut off with elements of the marine division. After rescuing his jeep driver by breaking up an ambush near a destroyed bridge Lt. Col. Page reached the lines of a surrounded marine garrison at Koto-ri. He then voluntarily developed and trained a reserve force of assorted army troops trapped with the marines. By exemplary leadership and tireless devotion he made an effective tactical unit available. In order that casualties might be evacuated, an airstrip was improvised on frozen ground partly outside of the Koto-ri defense perimeter which was continually under enemy attack. During 2 such attacks, Lt. Col. Page exposed himself on the airstrip to direct fire on the enemy, and twice mounted the rear deck of a tank, manning the machine gun on the turret to drive the enemy back into a no man’s land.

On 3 December while being flown low over enemy lines in a light observation plane, Lt. Col. Page dropped hand grenades on Chinese positions and sprayed foxholes with automatic fire from his carbine. After 10 days of constant fighting the marine and army units in the vicinity of the Chosin Reservoir had succeeded in gathering at the edge of the plateau and Lt. Col. Page was flown to Hamhung to arrange for artillery support of the beleaguered troops attempting to break out. Again Lt. Col. Page refused an opportunity to remain in safety and returned to give every assistance to his comrades. As the column slowly moved south Lt. Col. Page joined the rear guard. When it neared the entrance to a narrow pass it came under frequent attacks on both flanks. Mounting an abandoned tank Lt. Col. Page manned the machine gun, braved heavy return fire, and covered the passing vehicles until the danger diminished. Later when another attack threatened his section of the convoy, then in the middle of the pass, Lt. Col. Page took a machine gun to the hillside and delivered effective counterfire, remaining exposed while men and vehicles passed through the ambuscade.

On the night of 10 December the convoy reached the bottom of the pass but was halted by a strong enemy force at the front and on both flanks. Deadly small-arms fire poured into the column. Realizing the danger to the column as it lay motionless, Lt. Col. Page fought his way to the head of the column and plunged forward into the heart of the hostile position. His intrepid action so surprised the enemy that their ranks became disordered and suffered heavy casualties. Heedless of his safety, as he had been throughout the preceding 10 days, Lt. Col. Page remained forward, fiercely engaging the enemy single-handed until mortally wounded. By his valiant and aggressive spirit Lt. Col. Page enabled friendly forces to stand off the enemy. His outstanding courage, unswerving devotion to duty, and supreme self-sacrifice reflect great credit upon Lt. Col. Page and are in the highest tradition of the military service.

Over the years Infantry, Engineer, Signal and Supply units would also call Camp Page home, but the major tenant unit would eventually become the 4th Missile Command with their Honest John rockets.  This 4th Missile Command,Camp Page website has a number of photographs posted from the 1964 time period that are quite fascinating to view.  More pictures were taken by Dave Kowalsky during his tour in South Korea.  Here is the link to Dave’s webpage.  Here is what the front gate of the camp looked like in 1964:

The 4th Missile Command would remain on Camp Page until 1978 when it was deactivated.  You can see more of Dave’s pictures at this link.

After looking at the historical pictures of USFK installations, I always find it interesting to then go back and look at how the camp looks in modern times.  Here is a nice series of aerial photos of how Camp Page looked just back in 2010:

Camp Page was closed out in 2005 as part of the USFK transformation plan that will have the US military consolidating forces into major hubs at Osan AB, Camp Humphreys, and the Daegu area.  The last major tenant unit to call Camp Page home was the 1-2 Aviation Battalion that flew Apache helicopters from the base.  It took years of negotiations before the Korean government accepted the transfer of Camp Page back to the Korean government due to pollution concerns.  Those pollution concerns included allegations of Agent Orange dumping on Camp Page that have yet to be substantiated.  Even more troubling if true is that there was supposedly a nuclear accident that happened in 1972 as well.  The nuclear incident appears to have little creditability, but the pollution concerns are legitimate though nothing in regards to Agent Orange has ever been proven.  Even without Agent Orange there is still plenty of other pollution over the years that has accumulated on the base that this veteran actually has a picture of where they used to dump battery acid at on Camp Page:

 

Here you can see my buddies (1972-1973 tour) making pollution. Digging weeds and spreading Viet Nam Era Herbicide by hand with the help of coffee cans was a high tech operation and the disappearing battery acid trick was great. The orange Acid barrel had no bottom and was full of rocks.

It is stuff like this that I think is the biggest pollution hazards with USFK facilities in Korea, but the Korean media and anti-US groups in the country would rather sensationalize claims about Agent Orange and nuclear incidents to create further animosity between USFK and the Korean public.  However, two years ago the US and South Korea have worked together to develop a way ahead to address the environmental issues with the US paying the bulk of the clean up for the vacated bases even though the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the two countries says the US only needs to return vacated property in a “as is” condition.

Anyway back to more pictures of Camp Page, there were still a few quonset huts that were in use when the base closed, but most of the buildings on Camp Page were of modern vintage in 2010:

The now densely populated Chuncheon is built up all around the camp so it really was only a matter of time before USFK would have to shut down this camp:

Like the other camps that have been vacated by the US military Camp Page this year has been pretty much leveled and redevelopment to use the land by the local community has begun.  Here is a passage and picture from the 4th Missile Command, Camp Page site that describes recent developments on the old Camp Page:

Pam Austin, the photographer, wrote: “There is almost nothing left — the entire air strip has been torn up. The walls around the camp remain, as does the water tower, although the words ‘Camp Page’ have been whited out. The picture of the parking lot shows the new subway station across the street from the camp — the parking lot was built on what was part of the camp. I went through a year ago, and they still had the road signs up that pointed to the base. Those have now been removed. There appear to be some kind of warehouses on the ground, but they are made of really flimsy material. The whole site is fenced off — either with the original camp fence (still with rusting concertina wire on top), or with chain link from a construction company.”

The city of Chuncheon has plans of buying the land from the Korean government to use for a park, additional apartments, or a shopping mall.  Here is what the city is currently using the land for:

What used to be the main street on post is open to the public and links Chuncheon’s central business district to a new rail station where people can ride a bullet train to Seoul. The trip, which used to take two hours, takes only an hour these days.

Faster transport means more tourists, drawn by the area’s lakes, rivers and mountains to hike, ski and golf. Visitors can also check out some of the places where the hit soap opera “Winter Sonata” was filmed.

Since helicopter flights ended, restrictions on land development in Chuncheon have eased and most of the 173 buildings that were on Camp Page have been demolished.

Officials plan to consult the public before devising a long-term plan for the 145 acres of bare land that remains, according to Soon-mu Park, an official with Chuncheon City’s Urban Improvement Department.

About half the site has been earmarked for commercial development and the rest as public space. It’s possible that a park, local government buildings, a fire station and court house will be built there, officials said.

In the meantime, workers are turning one large hangar, once used by the U.S. Army, into a sports complex and another into a gymnasium for disabled people.  [Stars & Stripes]

Camp Page physically is mostly gone now, buried by the rapid development of South Korea.  Like other USFK camps that have been demolished and redeveloped, the memories of the US servicemembers that served on Camp Page will live on.

Current Google Earth image of Camp Page in Chuncheon

Note: You can read more from the ROK Drop featured series “A Profile of USFK Bases” at the below link:

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Note: Below are comments from the original www.rokdrop.com site that did not import correctly to the latest www.rokdrop.net site.  So I copied and pasted them into this posting for everyone to read.  Leave new comments down below.  If you served on Camp Page please share your memories of the camp in the comments section.

 

• Burma Bob
  7:39 pm on December 15th, 2011 1

In the summer of 1980, my unit (332nd ASA) was kicked off Cp Humphries and someone had the bright idea of sending us to Page. 4th Missile had been gone a couple of years, so we took over their old quonset huts and motor pool. Page made no tactical sense, as the units we supported were pretty far away to the west, and across two sets of pretty high ridges. Not many units on post, WSD-K, an ammo accounting unit, an aviation company, maybe 300 GI’s, tops.

The city of Chuncheon was a revelation after the squalor of Anjeongri. I think Page was one of the few camps that was located right in a big, normal city. The Koreans treated us very well, and for our part, I don’t think we acted too badly.

There were some GI clubs, but not many, and not very wild (the 21 club in the pic above was still open). The only weirdness happened during Team Spirit, when 25th ID staged a few BN’s there. Got to know what a boom town looked like when it happened.

Chuncheon “chicken rib” places were very popular, and it was possible to date and marry normal Korean girls, and many guys did.

All-in-all, the nicest place to be stationed in Korea.

• kushibo
  10:12 pm on December 15th, 2011 2

Why was it called Mt. Useless?

• Kingkitty
  2:10 pm on December 16th, 2011 3

I always thought of Camp Page as an old friend. I had a great time there

• DaveK
  3:40 pm on December 17th, 2011 4

Why was it called Mt. Useless? American flyers, annoyed by the way this lump lay across their approaches to Chuncheon’s airfield, called it “Unnecessary Mountain.” By the time we got to Chuncheon -1964-65- the mountain was called “Mt. Useless.”

• jesse l smith
  12:06 pm on December 22nd, 2011 5

i was shocked in a good way to see club “21″, there was another one called the “rainbow club” i would love to see a photo of that. how well i remember the 21 club. a perfect place for a 17 year old boy with 124 dollars a month and nothing to spend it on.

• Ricky W. Christian
  6:44 pm on December 22nd, 2011 6

As a 18 yr old from South Carolina, I was awstruck from the time I left SC, on my trek towards ChunChon via Alaska, Japan, and Korea. I was there as an MP from Oct 1975 until Nov 1976. Had a ball, met many new folks from all over the USA and Korea. I stayed in the Q. Huts some but mostly lived off post. So sorry to hear of its closing. Camp Page was a great place, and the page on Facebook is very good. Appreciate this site too!

• mark phelps
  5:12 pm on January 13th, 2012 7

I was stationed at the 226 in 1977/78. I remember running past the binjo carts during the morning pt, a smell i will never forget.I had a great time while I was there. Bought a killer stereo from the main px.

• Don Paul
  6:58 pm on January 15th, 2012 8

Great site. I was there for about two weeks of 1951.

• Don Paul
  7:00 pm on January 15th, 2012 9

1. I think it was known as K-47 then.

• Charlie Horse
  8:39 pm on January 15th, 2012 10

K-47 was the air strip, the base was still Camp Page.

• Bruce K. Nivens
  9:18 pm on March 19th, 2012 11

I was stationed at Camp Page from 1985 to 1987, assigned to the Weapons Support Detachment (WSD-K) as its communications officer. During my time there, the Camp Page Consolidated Club was transformed into the Page II Club — same Quonset hut structure on the outside but completely renovated on the inside. Many of the Quonset huts used for barracks were gutted and renovated as a transitional move to permanent buildings. The first permanent barracks building was completed near the south end of the post in 1986, and it housed enlisted soldiers. The big red and white water tower that still stands on Camp Page in the 2011 pictures was constructed during that time on the site of what used to be a snack bar. It was a marvel of construction, as the tank and the structure supporting it were built from the ground up, piece by piece. They drove piles into the ground to support the foundation, built the foundation, and then built the supporting structure a few feet at a time, constructing a scaffold around it as the structure grew. When the tank itself was built, it was done plate by plate – lots and lots of welding done by workers who were precariously perched on the scaffolding and sometimes hanging on swings strung from the scaffolding. The permanent barracks and the new water tower were the beginning of a major capital improvement project for Camp Page that really changed the look of the post in a lot of ways (based on the pictures I’ve seen).

• Bruce K. Nivens
  12:51 pm on March 20th, 2012 12

Regarding units: In my time on Camp Page (1985-1987), the largest units on post (excluding USAG CP) were the 128th Aviation BN (Blackhawk), a ROK aviation unit (Huey), and WSD-K. Just before I arrived, WSD-K administratively changed hands from 19th Support Command to Eighth Army Special Troops (EAST). According to my fellow WSD-K officers, the detachment held a transition ceremony during which they fired their obsolete 19th SUPCOM “flower” patches from their 75mm ceremonial cannon. Anyone who was stationed on Camp Page during this period knows which cannon I’m talking about, as it was fired every afternoon at retreat.

Regarding Chunchon: The clubs mentioned by others – “Club 21” and “Rainbow” – were there in the ‘ville, in addition to three other USFK-sanctioned clubs (their names escape me at the moment). Directly across the street from the main gate, on the right corner, was an excellent tailor shop. Up the sidewalk from that was the Charlie Shop, where they would embroider literally anything you wanted onto anything that would fit into their sewing machines. They could also make trophies and commemorative items. On the left side across from the main gate was a Tae-Kwon-Do studio and a small mom-n-pop restaurant that made the best yaki mandu (fried dumplings) – 10 dumplings in a bamboo box for 1000 Won ($1.19 — the exchange rate was 843 Won to the dollar when I arrived). The city itself was alive and bustling, the resort areas were nice and accessible, and for anyone looking to explore it, there was plenty to see and do in Chunchon.

Regarding Camp Page: USAG CP did a great job in making the post as pleasant as possible. Along the main streets there were several trees which really greened up the place during the warm months. We had a nice movie theater (“Top Gun” was shown in first-run when I was there). The consolidated clubs – the original, the transitional, and the Page II Club – were all well-run and welcoming. We had a crafts center, multiple snack bars, an education center, a small PX, American Express Bank, a gym, baseball diamond, and a swimming pool (at least for a while). There was a gravel perimeter road around the airfield that, combined with the paved roads inside the fence lines on the rest of the post, made a great 2.25-mile running track. Even when the capital improvement projects started up, the folks running the post did everything they could to keep the construction from being too disruptive. Given that Camp Page was considered to be a hardship post (unaccompanied assignments), and that most of the buildings were the original “T-“ temporary structures, we still had it pretty darned good compared to many other posts in the country (and I visited a lot of posts while I was there). I have some very good memories of Camp Page, and it makes me feel a bit old that the post and almost all of the “future” construction that was done there has since been wiped out by the bulldozers. Time marches on…

• SSG Brown Patrick
  4:21 pm on April 23rd, 2012 13

I have fun memories of that are especially outside the gate. Going to the restaurants the college playing basketball and the underground mall. But while I was there on Camp page I did develop skin problems and I have a large tumor like cyst that on my left hand between my thumb and index finger.

• Paul Fitsik III
  1:22 pm on December 28th, 2012 14

Served at Camp Page ITO from 1998-99. Miss Dak Kalbi, Yaki mandu at the KSB, and the city of ChunCheon. Had a great time and thoroughly loved that area of Korea.

• bobt592959
  12:55 am on December 29th, 2012 15

very interesting…

• Tony(Andy)Bodura
  4:17 pm on March 7th, 2013 16

I served at the MSA. Spent lots of time at Camp Page and the city. Great times.
tbodura@aol.com

• William Abell
  5:48 pm on March 9th, 2013 17

I was stationed at Camp Page from Jan 75 – April 79. I had loved both Korea and Camp Page.i miss the place and the people. Was thee any body there during my time. I spent the first 2 1/2 years in the 1st/42nd FA and than went down the street to WSD/K until April 79.I’ll get back on here to check other comments. Glad I ran across this site.

• george pierce
  12:48 pm on March 18th, 2013 18

Stationed at Camp Page 86-88 hq battlion 128 ahb. The clubs; 21,king,ranibow,flamingo,seven and cafe parking were and always will be (if only in memories) great places to just hang out with fellow soldiers and friends. There was a DJ @ the Rainbow named Mr. Pak and two girls named Sunnya and Myungha I will never forget. The camp itself was ok, I stayed off post for the most part. The night life was always wild and the redzone was something else. I would love to go back there sometime.

• george pierce
  12:52 pm on March 18th, 2013 19

I forgot OB beer and Jungle juice….

• george pierce
  12:54 pm on March 18th, 2013 20

oh and oscar and sonjo and Yaki mandu at the jinhe house

• Bob Donatelli
  9:55 am on March 22nd, 2013 21

I was stationed at Camp Page the entire year 1968, assigned to the 4th Support Co. Many good memories of the people I met and worked with there. Also many good memories of the Korean people.

• Dennis Kaskovich
  4:19 pm on March 22nd, 2013 22

At Page Jan’72 – Feb ’73. In the aviation section, ‘Rocket Airlines’. Great memories.

• Jay Buckmaster
  12:01 pm on March 31st, 2013 23

At Camp Page from Oct 70 – Nov 71 As a UH-1 Crew Chief assigned to Rocket Airlines. I had a lot of great times. However when it came time to go home I didn’t let the door hit me in the ass!

• Bill
  6:31 pm on May 15th, 2013 24

I was stationed at Camp McCullough (MSA) north of Camp Page in 1970 and guarded who knows what for 1/42 artillery. I cannot find one thing about it anywhere on the net. Does anyone know how to find something about it?

• Tony(Andy)Bodura
  3:32 am on May 16th, 2013 25

Bill I was at MSA 42, Camp McCullough from Aug 1969 to Oct 1970.
Email me.
tbodura@aol.com
Tony

• Greg Guiney
  7:09 pm on October 4th, 2013 26

Cousin Bruce! Those were the days my friend!

• Bruce K. Nivens
  7:51 pm on October 4th, 2013 27

#26 – Yes, cousin Greg, indeed they were. Did I get the details right? Did I miss anything worth posting in this thread about the old post?

• Jerry Dorsey
  4:53 pm on December 27th, 2013 28

I serve in the 1/42 field Artillery from January 1976 til December 1976, and I serve with William Abell. Members of the unit called me Hero. Our first Sgt. was Albert Mack. I still have fun memories of my stay at Camp Paige and would love to visit Chuncheon. Good to hear from a old soldier.

• michael french
  11:04 am on February 24th, 2014 29

hello was there 1965 to 1966 4th missile command as a pfc wire section loved south korea had a good time.

• Doug Schlumbohm
  7:35 am on April 29th, 2014 30

I served three tours at Camp Page between June 1970 and Mar 1977. I also served as Det Sgt of Camp McCullough with 1/LT Richard A. Ward in 1970 and 8 months in the EAF at Camp Colbern in 1973. My last duty asgmt was Op Sgt, 4th USA Msl Comd in 1977. I went back on a visit in 1980 and there were Korean Contract Police on the gate.

• Lawrence (Larry) Williams
  10:47 am on May 6th, 2014 31

I was stationed at Camp Page from July 1970 to August 1971 and served in the 161st Engineer Co. I was an explosives/demolition specialist although I ended up working as the company clerk. When I arrived our CO was Cpt. Jerome Darga and when he rotated out the new CO was Cpt. Charles J Mills. Mills was an amazing young officer a genuine Airborne Ranger but was totally approachable and well liked by the officers and men. We had a large KATUSA compliment and some of us became friends with some of the KATYSAs and went out into the local community with them and saw a much different side of Chunchon than that presented in the usual GI hangouts. Our company area was directly across the street from the water tower and actually included the water tower because we had a water purification platoon in the 161 Engineer Co. We also had an ADM(Atomic Demolitions Munitions) platoon and I was briefly assigned there when I first arrived. But I was scarfed up by the CO when he found out I could type because his company clerk was leaving in a couple of weeks and he was not getting a replacement. The orderly room was a very tense place at first because the Cpt. Darga and 1st Sgt. Eugene hated each other. It got so bad that the 1st Sgt. was actually courtmartialed and got reduced in rank and reassigned to another post. The next 1st Sgt. was Sgt. MacLaughlin and he was a genuine good guy and very interesting person. For the most part Camp Page was a good post. There was a nice movie theater right on the post and I still remember the day that the movie M*A*S*H came to town. We really hooted and hollered at that one as you can well imagine. For the most part I have good memories of my time at Camp Page

• Ron Kastner
  8:35 pm on May 26th, 2014 32

I was stationed at camp page May 1969 to June1970 as SP5 company clerk for 7th batallion, 5th artillary under First Sergeant L.C.Woods and Captain John C Taylor. I felt very lucky to be assigned there instead of Vietnam Nam. With the exception of the snow it was great duty. Spent a ton of time in the NCO club perfecting my pool game. Often visited the Hawk missile sites with the CO and first sergeant as well as the DMZ. Still wonder about the agent orange exposure at the sites and DMZ.

https://twitter.com/SouthKoreaDaily/status/588418510964953088

It seems to me that an app developer is well within their rights to charge a commission based on what the market demands.  No one is forcing these restaurant owners to use their app service.  The owners could always take the time to learn app development themselves:

Kim Seong-ah, a 27-year-old fashion designer, loved the idea of ordering food through an app without having to leave her couch.

But she had an unsatisfactory experience with one service six months ago. Her meal from the franchise Nene Chicken, one of the choices on the app she was using, was late and the portion was smaller than what she gets when she orders from the company directly by phone.

When Kim spoke to her friends and her brother, she discovered that they had had similar experiences. She found clues on why from various news articles, which reported that some merchants deliberately provide a poorer service for app users in order to make up for the losses incurred by the fees the platforms levy.

The country’s top three food-delivery apps – Baedal Minjok, Yogiyo and Baedaltong – charge restaurant owners between 2.5 percent to 12.5 percent of commission per order.

The flare-up over the app-based delivery system is the latest testament to the fact that advanced technology meant to increase convenience can cause unexpected consequences for different parties.

In this case, the controversy stems from the fact that the apps have come up with their own charges without seeking a fair agreement with users and restaurants, critics say.  [Joong Ang Ilbo]

You can read the rest at the link, but restaurant owners now want the Korean government to get involved to force a fair fee for the app developers’ services.  If the customers keep getting poor products from app ordering then they will go back to using the telephone thus decreasing the demand for the app.  This is what would naturally force the app developers to drop their prices without government intervention.

It is going to be hard for President Park to launch an anti-corruption campaign in the wake of the Sewol ferry boat tragedy when the people around her that are supposed to implement it are all taking bribes if the allegations are true:

Sung, the chairman of Keangnam Enterprises, died in an apparent suicide after leaving the list.

Although President Park ordered the prosecution to conduct a thorough investigation into the graft scandal, Sunday, Cheong Wa Dae has refrained from commenting on the issue.

In a bid to fight corruption, she vowed again Thursday that anyone who is found to be involved in any illicit activities will face the consequences without exception.

Park’s biggest political hurdle would appear to be the besieged prime minister, because Lee is leading the government’s ambitious anti-corruption campaign.

The Kyunghyang Shinmun, which interviewed Sung hours before his death, reported Tuesday that the businessman said he had given Lee 30 million won ($27,000) during the 2013 by-elections, when Lee ran for a parliamentary seat representing Buyeo, South Chungcheong Province.

Park has set her sights on fighting graft as part of strengthening her control because the April 16, 2014 sinking of the ferry Sewol, which hit her administration hard, was blamed on collusive ties between ferry operators, regulators and politicians.

In addition, Park’s plans to reform the debt-heavy pension system for civil servants and the stiff labor market are also expected to hit a snag amid intensifying political attacks from opposition parties. The processing of economy-related bills pending before the National Assembly is also not on the cards in the short-term.  [Korea Times]

You can read the rest at the link, but I don’t understand why the Korean politicians don’t just legalize bribery and just call it campaign contributions like how the US political system works.

2 Killed In Attack On South Korean Embassy In Libya.

Women take a selfie at the KAIST campus in Daejeon on Friday.[Chosun Ilbo]

It has been over a decade since Charles Hanley and the other AP writers were proven to have used lies to promote their narrative of 400 Korean civilians massacred under a railway bridge at No Gun Ri during the Korean War.  Despite the debunking of their then Pulitzer Prize winning article Hanley continues to try and convince people that despite their article being false it is still true.  His latest attempt to push this false narrative is in Japan Focus:

In the early weeks after North Korea’s invasion of the south on June 25, 1950, the fear that North Korean infiltrators lurked among southern refugees was fed by a few plausible reports and a torrent of rumors. Research at the U.S. National Archives by the Associated Press team that confirmed the No Gun Ri Massacre, both before and after their September 29, 1999 investigative report, found at least 16 documents in which high-ranking U.S. officers ordered or authorized the shooting of refugees in the war’s early months.

First of all I recommend for those who haven’t to read my prior posting that debunked the original AP article at the below link:

• Responding to the Bridge at No Gun Ri

For those that have read my prior posting you would know that the AP’s document search at the National Archives did not confirm the No Gun Ri massacre at all.  They cannot point to one document that confirms a massacre happened at No Gun Ri.  Also notice how Hanley tries to make it out that their team uncovered the shooting of refugees during the Korean War when in fact the shooting of refugees was nothing new and could be read about in all the major historical publications from the Korean War.  In fact it was published in the major media outlets during the time of the war as well.  Here is an example in the New York Times:

“Fear of infiltrators led to the slaughter of hundreds of South Korean civilians, women as well as men, by some U.S. troops….”[xi]

Front Page of The New York Times
September 30, 1950 referring to events in July of 1950

So basically all they did was rehash old news and sensationalize it to an audience that had grown unfamiliar with the Korean War.  Even one of the AP writers Choe Sang-hun admitted in the book “Korea Witness” that the goal was to create a “Korean My Lai”.  Choe is the person who initially began the AP reporting into No Gun Ri and admitted that before he even interviewed one witness or even went to the scene he wrote a 150-word story pitch to submit to his AP editor. In the story pitch he used the advice of one of his colleagues to “hype” the story by likening No Gun Ri to a “Korean My Lai”.  The AP writers knew that just reporting a story of civilians killed during the Korean War is not something that would grab anyone’s attention. They had to make No Gun Ri bigger than what is was, they had to make it like My Lai because that is what Pulitzer Prizes are made of.

Next in the Japan Focus article Hanley goes on to push another narrative that commanders gave orders to indiscriminately shoot the civilians under the bridge at No Gun Ri:

Such communications, showing a command readiness to kill civilians indiscriminately, pointed to a high likelihood that the No Gun Ri killings, carried out by the 7th Cavalry Regiment, were ordered or authorized by a chain of command. A half-century later, lest that case be made, Army investigators excluded 14 of those documents from their report and misrepresented two others.

Yet they cannot prove that commanders gave an order to indiscriminately shoot civilians at No Gun Ri.  In fact here is what the officer who was at the scene that day in July of 1950 at No Gun Ri had to say about what happened:

However, retired Colonel Robert Carroll, who was a lieutenant on the scene at No Gun Ri tell CNN he is convinced no slaughter of civilians took place. He called the allegation, “selective and imaginative memory on the part of a lot of people.”

Carroll said the orders he received, while ordering troops to fire on anyone trying to cross the front lines, also urged discretion in the case of women and children.

“Use discretion was part of that order,” he said. “We used discretion. We did not fire automatic weapons. There was a few riflemen fired at them when they came around the bend. I stopped that. I personally stopped all the firing.”

“If there was any firing at those (people), it had to be later in the day, after I left. And somebody would have countermanded that order,” he said.

“We were not using our machine guns except when we were under attack because we were short on ammunition,” Carroll said. “We had not been resupplied; we had been moving, retreating, falling back for about a week. So that guy is dreaming.”

Interestingly enough in the original AP article Hanley made sure that Carroll’s eyewitness testimony of what happened that day was not fully included.  Instead Hanley relied on witness testimony of people who were not even there that day or misquoted or flat out lied about what others had said.  Here is a breakdown of the 12 GI witnesses the AP had in their original article and the status of their testimony once it was scrutinized:

1. Patterson: misquoted
2. Kerns: misquoted
3. Tinkler: suspect testimony
4. Hesselman: not there
5. Carroll: says no massacre occurred
6. Daily: not there
7. Flint: not there
8. Louis: not there
9. Steward: misquote
10. Lippincott: says no massacre occurred
11. Huff: heard civilians killed during the war not at No Gun Ri
12. George Preece: misquoted

Here comes Hanley’s next major talking point, there is a big government conspiracy to hide massacres that occurred during the Korean War:

In addition, the unit document that would have contained orders dealing with the No Gun Ri refugees, the 7th Cavalry journal for July 1950, is missing without explanation from the National Archives. The Army inquiry’s 2001 report concealed this fact, while claiming its investigators had reviewed all relevant documents and that no orders to shoot were issued at No Gun Ri.

Here is how the Army report of 2001 dealt with three important pieces of evidence, among many documents suppressed or distorted.

The document that Hanley is referring to is the Rogers Memo:

One of the key elements of the AP’s version of events is that an air strike was called in on the refugee column just prior to reaching the railway bridge at No Gun Ri. During the Pentagon investigation into the events of No Gun Ri a memorandum written by Colonel Turner Rogers who was a United States Air Force operations officer at the time of the Korean War was disclosed.  In the memorandum Colonel Rogers expresses his concern to his superior officer about the Army requesting to the Air Force to strafe civilians dressed in white who the front line soldiers believed were disguised as North Korean soldiers. Colonel Rogers notes that the US Air Force has so far complied with Army requests to strafe specified refugee columns that were believe to be North Korean infiltrators. However, Colonel Rogers felt that strafing these suspected North Korean infiltrators was not something the Air Force should be doing and suggested that the Army should just shoot suspected North Korean infiltrators themselves. Interestingly enough the now retired Major General Turner Rogers does not remember this memorandum and could not provide any additional details about it to the Pentagon Review team that investigated the No Gun Ri tragedy. Also of note is that the document is not signed by Colonel Rogers, it just has his signature block. It may have drafted by a subordinate officer and for whatever reason was never signed by the Colonel thus why he does not remember it.

However, Hanley like he does in the Japan Focus article likes to claim that since the Rogers Memo was not in the Pentagon Report that the Army was covering it up as part of the wider conspiracy to hide the civilian killings during the Korean War.  The only problem with this theory is that the Pentagon report included a memorandum written by the Navy that documented a strafing of Korean refuges by naval aircraft dispatched from the aircraft carrier the USS Valley Forge:

Several of fifteen to twenty people dressed in white were sighted. The first group was strafed in accordance with information received from the Army that groups of more than eight to ten people were to be considered troops, and were to be attacked. Since the first pass indicated that the people seemed to be civilians, other groups were investigated by non-firing runs.  No Gun Ri Review, (Department of the Army Inspector General, January 2001), Chapter 3 Combat Operations in July 1950, Page 98

Some cover up.  Likely the Rogers memo may not have been included because it was simply overlooked in the mountains of documents the reviewers had to pour through or was discarded due to the fact it was not signed.  Notice how in the Japan Focus article Hanley made sure the document image was cropped so that readers could not see that the document wasn’t signed.  However, all of this is irrelevant because it was widely known that civilians were strafed during the Korean War and the Pentagon included documented evidence that this happened in their report.  What is relevant is that there is no evidence of a strafing ever happening at No Gun Ri which is something Hanley does not want to talk about.  Claimants claimed that the 7th Cavalry soldiers intentionally called in an airstrike on them.  There is only one problem with this, the 7^th Cavalry did not have the necessary radios to even call in an air strike. In fact the only air strike in the No Gun Ri area occurred on July 27^th, which was one day after the refugees say they were strafed. However, this air strike on the 27^th was when the 7^th Cavalry headquarters was strafed. This strafing of the 7^th Cavalry caused their commander to request an Air Force Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) to the regiment who had the necessary radios to talk to the pilots in order to avoid any further strafings of the 7^th Cavalry.  The below air mission chart shows how there were no airstrike around No Gun Ri on July 26, 1950 as claimed:

The Korean claimants also claim they were bombed. During an interview with a Korean reporter No Gun Ri witness Chung Gu-shik said the refugee column was bombed by a fighter jet, approximately 100 people and many animals were blown to pieces, and that the railway was bent like “steel chopsticks”. He goes on to say the bombing lasted for a total of 20 minutes. American and Korean imagery analysts that reviewed aerial footage of No Gun Ri taken one week after the incident found no signs of rails bent like “steel chopsticks”, no bomb craters, no left over refugee items, no dead animals, and most importantly no dead bodies.

Can you spot the 400 dead bodies? Korean and American imagery analysts could not either. 

Back to the Air Force and Naval memorandums, it is important to realize they were both dated July 25, 1950. The Naval and Air Force officers that coordinated air operations during the early days of the Korean War worked together in the same Joint Operations Center (JOC). Obviously the requests from the Army to strafe civilians that were alleged to be North Korean infiltrators had sparked much debate with the JOC between the Air Force and Navy on July 25^th based on the memos.  These concerns most likely got back to the 8th Army headquarters where more pressure was mounted to come up with a suitable policy for the massive refugee crisis. Eighth Army responded with the July 26^th refugee control order to all its subordinate units that was also importantly approved of by the South Korean government.   The Eighth Army policy either directly or indirectly took the advice of Colonel Rogers to have the US Army decide whether to shoot suspected North Korean infiltrators and not the Air Force.  However, unlike Hanley’s claims of orders to indiscriminately shoot civilians, the refugee policy created a system where the Korean police would consolidate care for and move the refugees through friendly lines at set times every day and forbid any movement of civilians at night. Leaflets were dropped to spread this information to include the Korean police going in and evacuating villages.

Nowhere in this order was there ever any orders to indiscriminately kill refugees as the AP writers would lead you to believe. The order was to not permit civilians to cross battle lines who were not following the established procedures.  Hanley goes on to discuss another document he regular brings up as proof of orders to shoot refugees:

Major General William B. Kean, commander of the 25th Infantry Division, which held the front line to the right of the 1st Cavalry Division, the division responsible for No Gun Ri, issued an order to all his units dated July 27, 1950, saying civilians were to have been evacuated from the war zone and therefore “all civilians seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly.”

Again, the Army investigators of 2001 had to grapple with this explosive document, since it had been reported in the original AP story on No Gun Ri. And so they simply chose to write of this order, “There is nothing to suggest any summary measures were considered against refugees.”  They suggested that when Kean said civilians should be treated as enemy, he meant front-line combat troops should “arrest” this supposed enemy, not shoot him—an implausible scenario in the midst of a shooting war.

Once again it is important to read the whole document and understand the context of when it was published:

By reading the whole the whole document you gain the context of why the order by General Kean was given in the first place. Actions against refugees was only going to be taken after the Korean National Police had cleared the area and reported back to General Kean that the area had been evacuated. Only after that were people found in the area declared hostile. The order does not say shoot refugees, but leaves the action that needs to be taken to stop the infiltration of refugees to the commanders on the ground. General Kean’s order was completely in line with the refugee policy issued by Eighth Army the day prior that was approved by both the Korean and American governments.

The next document that Hanley writes about in his Japan Focus article is the Muccio Letter:

Perhaps the most important document excluded from the U.S. Army’s 300-page No Gun Ri Review was a U.S. Embassy communication with Washington that sat unnoticed for decades at the National Archives. In 2005, American historian Sahr Conway-Lanz reported his discovery of this document, a letter from the U.S. ambassador to South Korea in 1950, John J. Muccio, to Dean Rusk, then-assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, dated July 26, 1950, the day the killings began at No Gun Ri.¹¹ In it, Muccio reported to Rusk on a meeting that took place the previous evening among American and South Korean officials, military and civilian, to formulate a plan for handling refugees.

He wrote that the South Korean refugee problem “has developed aspects of a serious and even critical military nature.” Disguised North Korean soldiers had been infiltrating American lines via refugee columns, he said, and “naturally, the Army is determined to end this threat.” At the meeting, he wrote, “the following decisions were made: 1. Leaflet drops will be made north of U.S. lines warning the people not to proceed south, that they risk being fired upon if they do so. If refugees do appear from north of U.S. lines they will receive warning shots, and if they then persist in advancing they will be shot.” The ambassador said he was writing Rusk “in view of the possibility of repercussions in the United States” from such deadly U.S. tactics.

The letter stands as a clear statement of a theater-wide U.S. policy to open fire on approaching refugees. It also shows this policy was known to upper ranks of the U.S. government in Washington.

Here is the full text of the Muccio Letter:

PERSONAL-CONFIDENTIAL

The Foreign Service of the United States of America

American Embassy

July 26, 1950

Dear Dean: The refugee problem has developed aspects of a serious and even critical military nature, aside from the welfare aspects. Necessarily, decisions are being made by the military in regard to it, and in view of the possibility of repercussions in the United States from the effectuation of these decisions, I have thought it desirable to inform you of them.

The enemy has used the refugees to his advantage in many ways: by forcing them south and so clogging the roads as to interfere with military movements; by using them as a channel for infiltration of agents; and most dangerous of all by disguising their own troops as refugees, who after passing through our lines proceed, after dark, to produce hidden weapons, and then attack our units from the rear. Too often such attacks have been devastatingly successful. Such infiltrations had a considerable part in the defeat of the 24th Division at Taejon.

Naturally, the Army is determined to end this threat. Yesterday evening a meeting was arranged, by 8th Army HQ request, at the office of the Home Minister at the temporary Capitol. G-1, G-2, Provost Marshall, CIC, the Embassy, the Home and Social Affairs Ministries, and the Director National Police. The following decisions were made:

1. Leaflet drops will be made north of US lines banning the people not to proceed south, that they risk being fired upon if they do so. If refugees do appear from north of US lines they will receive warning shots, and if they then persist in advancing they will be shot.
2. Leaflet drops and oral warning by police within US combat zone will be made to the effect that no one can move south unless ordered, and then only under police control, that all movement of Korean civilians must end at sunset or those moving will risk being shot when dark comes.
3. Should the local tactical commander consider it essential to evacuate a given sector he will notify the police liaison officers attached to his HQ, who through the area Korean National Police will notify the inhabitants, and start them southward under police control on specified minor roads. No one will be permitted to move unless police notify them, and those further south not notified will be required to stay put.
4. Refugee groups must stop at sunset, and not move again until daylight. Police will establish check points to catch enemy agents; subsequently Social Ministry will be prepared to care for, and direct refugees to camps or other areas.
5. No mass movements unless police controlled will be permitted. Individual movements will be subject to police checks at numerous points.
6. In all cities, towns curfew will be at 9 p.m., with effective enforcement at 10 p.m. Any unauthorized person on streets after 10 p.m. is to be arrested, and carefully examined. The last item is already in effect.

Sincerely,

John J. Muccio

Nowhere in the Muccio Letter are there any concerns about war crimes, Geneva Convention, or anything else that Hanley wants readers to believe. Ambassador Muccio was simply doing his job by notifying the State Department about the Eighth Army refugee policy that had already been disseminated that day across the theater. The newsworthiness of this letter is that it shines a light on why the Eighth Army refugee policy was created in the first place. The letter clearly states that the policy was established in response to the North Korean violations of the laws of war by using soldiers dressed as civilians to infiltrate into the rear areas of the 24^th Infantry Division. Muccio says himself that the North Korean tactics played a “considerable part in the defeat of the 24th Division at Taejon”. This destruction of the 24^th Infantry Division at Taejon is what led to the collapse of the US war effort in the early days of the Korean War. Interestingly enough nowhere in Hanley’s article is the destruction of the 24^th Division mentioned.

What else Muccio provides insight into is that the refugee handling order was not something that was taken lightly. The order was only implemented after a meeting at the Eighth Army headquarters that included officials from the Korean government, US Embassy officials, and the Director of the Korean National Police. All these elements agreed to the refugee control order and was not something that was created by the U.S. military on a whim so they did not have to deal with the refugees. It was in fact a very thoroughly thought out policy that was only issued after close consultation with elements of the Korean government. Despite the fact that the Korean government played a key role in this refugee order, Hanley has long down played this fact.  What Hanley will never down play is his fixation on a massive government conspiracy:

In 2006, under pressure for an explanation from the South Korean government, the Army acknowledged that its investigators of 1999-2001 had seen the Muccio letter, but it claimed they dismissed it as unimportant because it “outlined a proposed policy,” not an approved one – an argument that defied the plain English of the letter, which said the policy of shooting approaching refugees was among “decisions made.^“ In his book Collateral Damage (2006), Conway-Lanz attests to the letter’s crucial importance, writing that “with this additional piece of evidence, the Pentagon report’s interpretation (of No Gun Ri) becomes difficult to sustain” – that is, its conclusion that the refugee killings were “not deliberate” became ever more untenable^.

The Muccio Letter however offers nothing new.  As I already mentioned all it did was summarize the points from the 8th Army refugee control order that had already been published years prior.  If anything the Army would have wanted this letter included in the Pentagon report because it further establishes the rationale behind why the 8th Army issued their refugee control order in the first place; because of the massive infiltration of North Korean soldiers disguised as refugees that led to the destruction of the 24th Division. The letter also makes it quite clear that this policy was methodically thought out in complete consultation with the South Korean government and military which agreed fully to the recommendations.

Hanley concludes his Japan Focus article by highlighting the opening of the No Gun Ri Peace Park:

Although the truth of mid-1950 South Korea and No Gun Ri was whitewashed and distorted at every turn in 2001 in Washington, DC, it has now found a home in the two-story, 20,365-square-foot memorial museum and its surrounding three-year-old No Gun Ri Peace Park, a gently landscaped place of arched bridges and flowered walkways, stretching from the bullet-pocked railroad underpasses of 1950, through a garden of powerfully evocative sculptures bearing such titles as “Ordeal” and “Searching for Hope,” to the bottom of a path leading to a hilltop cemetery and the graves of No Gun Ri victims, marked “1950-7-26.”

I actually have no problem with this park as long as it is depicting an accurate interpretation of history.  I have not had a chance to visit it yet, but I eventually will so I won’t comment on this yet, but I would be interested in feedback from people who have.  However, I do like this parting shot at me and other critics of Hanley’s reporting:

Two years after the Army’s deceitful report, a Pentagon-affiliated publisher issued an Army apologist’s polemic on No Gun Ri, an often-incoherent book packed with disinformation. In the English-language Wikipedia, the “No Gun Ri Massacre” article became a Wikipedic free-for-all between jingoistic denialists and the truth. Finally, ironically around the time the Korean park was opened in 2011, the U.S. Defense Department purged from its website the Army’s investigative report, further pushing No Gun Ri toward official oblivion.

The book he is referring to is then Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bateman’s book “No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident.”  This book greatly destroyed the credibility of the original AP article which caused Hanley to begin a vicious feud with Bateman which continues by regularly taking shots at him like you see in this latest Japan Focus article.  In fact Bateman has accused Hanley of even trying to stop the publication of his book.  It is ironic that a journalist tried so hard to stop free speech.  Then the description “denialists” I find quite humorous because he is evoking the term for people who bring up legitimate questions about global warming.  One of Hanley’s favorite tactics since he cannot debate facts is that he relies on personal attacks to silence critics just like the global warming crowd.  So it is only fitting that in recent years Hanley has also become a big media promoter for global warming.

Much like with global warming, No Gun Ri is something that did happen. However, like global warming what did happen at No Gun Ri has been sensationalized to make it more than what it was.  No Gun Ri was not the “Korean My Lai” the AP journalists were so eager to create. The facts show that US soldiers were on the retreat and wary of North Korean infiltrators.  Witness testimony from people who were there say that warning shots were fired over the top of the refugees in order to prevent them from advancing toward their frontline. This firing over the refugees may have been interpreted by the gunmen within the column as being directed towards them and they fired back which ended up causing US soldiers to fire directly into the refugee column.  The warning shots could have also caused other soldiers on the frontline unaware of what was going on to think they were being fired at.  Other veteran witness statements, Soviet shell casings found underneath the bridge, unit supply records showing Soviet weapons turned into the 7th Cavalry supply personnel, and prior documented instances of civilian clothed guerrilla fighters engaging US troops makes for a strong case that there could have been gun men within the refugee column.

If there were gunmen who were they? Were they disguised North Korean soldiers? Probably not. It is more likely they were South Korean communist guerrillas. Before the Korean War began the Yongdong area of South Korea was a known communist guerrilla hide out. US veteran witnesses say the gun men they found dead underneath the bridge wore no uniforms. Veteran also say that the number of refugees killed underneath the bridge from the brief firing numbered to about 4-9 killed with more wounded. It is impossible to know but some of those wounded could have died later on increasing the death toll. Determining the exact death toll is impossible but it is not the 400 or simply “hundreds” as the AP claims.  This was confirmed when imagery analysts looked at aerial footage a week after the shooting and could find no evidence of bodies being dragged away, stacked under the bridge, or buried in mass graves.  There was also no evidence of an airstrike on July 26th as well.

Despite these facts the sensationalization of the No Gun Ri tragedy continues on as an entire generation of Korean War soldiers continue to be labeled as war criminals by people like Charles Hanley.  The Korean War has long been known as the “Forgotten War” however it has quickly become what I like to call the “Rewritten War” that began with the false narrative perpetuated by the AP’s original No Gun Ri reporting.  There are many tragedies from the Korean War and the continuing sliming of the US military veterans who fought in it is one of them.