This would explain why Kim Jong-un made the unusual public appearance of sorrow after the tragic bus accident in North Korea that killed 32 Chinese tourists:
Chinese communist revolutionary Mao Zedong’s only grandson Mao Xinyu was possibly killed in a bus crash in North Korea in April that killed over 30 Chinese, according to a report from French radio.
Xinyu, the son of Mao Zedong’s second son Anqing who died fighting in the Korean War, was possibly one of 32 Chinese tourists who died when a bus fell from a bridge in North Hwanghae Province, Radio France Internationale’s Chinese version reported on April 30, citing a Chinese source.
The report said Xinyu, a Major General in the People’s Liberation Army of China, and most of the other Chinese tourists were the children of Chinese soldiers who fought in the Korean War.
The accident also killed four North Koreans.
The tourists died reportedly on their way back from a cemetery in Hoechang County in South Pyongan Province that was for Chinese soldiers who died during the Korean War. Mao Zedong’s eldest son Anying was buried there, which leads to the supposition Xinyu could have visited the cemetery to pay tribute to his uncle.
If it is true that Xinyu was among the dead, two direct descendants of Mao Zedong have perished on the Korean Peninsula. [Korea Times]
Below is a fascinating read in the Nikkei Asian Review about how the Kim regime has long claimed that Northeastern China should be ceded to North Korea:
Back in May 2000, Kim Jong Il made his first trip to China as North Korea’s top leader. An informal visit, it was kept under wraps until Kim, the father of North Korea’s current leader, returned to Pyongyang.
Kim had a big request for Jiang Zemin, then China’s president.
“I am preparing for an inspection of the northeast region [of China],” Kim told Jiang. “Could you make arrangements for it?”
Jiang’s face contorted into a quizzical expression. The word Kim used was the Korean equivalent of shicha, a Chinese term meaning inspection. Inspections are what leaders conduct to see how their own common people are doing.
Kim’s use of inspection not only contradicted reality, it was disrespectful to China.
Jiang told Kim in a calm manner, “In your case, you mean visit, correct?”
“No,” Kim snapped back immediately. “It is an inspection. My father [Kim Il Sung, North Korea’s first leader] told me that the entire ‘northeast’ belongs to us.”
Stunned by Kim’s response, Jiang asked the North Korean leader, “How can the ‘northeast’ be all yours?”
“This is not my father’s view,” Kim said. “This is a remark made by Chairman Mao Zedong,” the founding father of the People’s Republic of China.
Again, Jiang was flabbergasted. This time, he summoned an official from the Communist Party’s International Liaison Department and ordered him to check whether Mao had actually made such a remark in the past.
The official reported back to Jiang the following afternoon, confirming Mao’s remarks. [Nikkei Asian Review]
You can read the rest at the link, but Mao made a comment to Kim Il-sung how prior Korean dynasties had been pushed out of Northeast China to south of the Yalu River by past Chinese emperors. Kim Il-sung used that comment to justify North Korea being ceded a chunk of Northeast China which Chinese leaders over the years have scoffed at to include when Kim Jong-il brought it up. It is unclear if the current North Korean leader Kim Jong-un shares such delusions of grandeur, but considering that his grandfather and father believed in it, I would not be surprised if Kim Jong-un doesn’t bring up the issue again at some point with China as well.
Noted journalist Blaine Harden has a good piece published on the PBS Frontline website that explains why North Korea has such an adversarial relationship with China despite the Kim regime being dependent on their aid:
Kim Il-sung grew up in northeast China, where in the 1930s he became a guerrilla leader and fought alongside Chinese Communist partisans against Japanese occupiers. Without warning, local Communists turned on Kim and his men. Several hundred ethnic Koreans were tortured and murdered in a racist purge based on the party’s paranoid, and false, belief that they were secretly working with the Japanese.
Kim was arrested in China in 1934 and was lucky to survive. He later called the purge “a mad wind … [Koreans] were being slaughtered indiscriminately by [Chinese] with whom they had shared bread and board only yesterday.”
During the Korean War, his bitter memories were compounded by a painfully public loss of face. Kim Il-sung started the war in 1950 by invading South Korea with the backing of Stalin’s Soviet Union. But his army was soon obliterated by an American-led coalition and North Korea all but disappeared — until Chinese forces entered the fight and forced Kim to the sidelines of his own war. China’s top general, Peng Dehuai, chided Kim for his “extremely childish” leadership, telling him, “You are hoping to end this war based on luck.”
Kim Il-sung would never forget how he was treated. After the war, he made sure that China’s role in saving and rebuilding his state was largely erased from official histories. His resentment was compounded in 1980, when China publicly denounced as feudalism his decision to transfer absolute power to his son, Kim Jong Il, a succession that made North Korea the world’s only hereditary Communist kingdom.
Ill feelings between North Korea and China have often been mutual. Mao Zedong regarded Kim Il-sung as rash and doctrinaire — once describing him as “a number-one pain in the butt.” In 1992, China infuriated the Kim family by establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea, the archenemy of the North. [PBS Frontline]
You can read more at the link, but just like his grandfather Kim Jong-un is being a “pain in the butt” to China. However, he knows he can be adversarial because the Chinese will likely do nothing to remove the Kim regime because of the alternatives to the “pain in the butt” are worse. That is why the Chinese will never completely abandon the regime until there is a better alternative offered.
Here is an interesting historical analysis of the Chinese, Russian, and North Korean relationship during the early years of the Kim Il-sung regime. This historical analysis does have some interesting parallels on why the Chinese government continues to support the Kim Jong-un regime today:
But for all the frustration, North Korea is an important piece on Beijing’s diplomatic board. If played incorrectly, it could backfire on China to the detriment of its bid for global leadership. Bringing Kim to his knees on behalf of the international community does nothing to advance Xi’s vision of a China-centered order in East Asia.
This is not new. Beijing has played this game before—most disastrously in 1956, when then North Korean leader Kim Il Sung brutally purged his political opponents suspected of ties to China and the Soviet Union. Moscow and Beijing intervened on their behalf, but Kim outplayed his allies with Machiavellian guile.
The crisis was also a turning point for China’s relations with North Korea. It was in 1956 that Beijing realized it had to go easy on Pyongyang, despite Kim’s maddening obstinacy, because the alternative was to surrender the country to the Soviet influence. As difficult as Kim was, he kept his distance from Moscow, and he could be an important ally in Beijing’s bid for leadership in the socialist bloc. Overnight, North Korea became an issue in China’s relationship with the Soviet Union, much as today it complicates China’s relationship with the United States. [China File]
Here is some interesting dialogue between Chinese premier Mao Zedong and the Soviets based off of records released from the Soviet archives:
Mao agreed with Mikoyan that there were serious problems in Pyongyang. Himself a ruthless dictator, Mao claimed Kim, who “still does the Stalin thing,” appalled him. “He brooks no word of disagreement and kills all who tries to oppose him,” Mao said.
But he claimed that China had no influence on the North Koreans. “This time we have to mainly rely on you,” he told Mikoyan. “They won’t listen to China!” Mikoyan retorted that Moscow’s leverage was hardly any better, but Mao disagreed: “They won’t listen to China 100 percent of the time. They won’t listen to you 70 percent of the time.”
Mikoyan said he simply did not understand why Kim was acting this way. Mao knew why: “He is afraid that our two parties are digging under the wall [of his house].”
And Mao, sensing, rightly or wrongly, that Moscow was plotting Kim’s ouster, warned the Soviet envoy they should not try to topple him. The Chinese leader opposed the Soviet practice of overthrowing recalcitrant tyrants. Nor did he think Kim’s regime was as bad as the Soviets claimed. After all, Mao’s own regime was not exactly democratic either. If he helped bring down Kim’s house, he would set a precedent that could one day be used against him.
There was another reason for Mao’s hesitation. He was beginning to challenge Moscow for leadership in the socialist camp. He accused the Soviets of arrogance, and of trying to impose their will on other countries. Much as he feared letting Kim get away with brutalities would lead to North Korea’s collapse, he did not want the Soviets to use him as a proxy.
You look at what is happening today and you see the parallel that the Chinese do not want the Kim regime toppled and have continued to oppose attempts by the US to impose its will on other countries around the world to include North Korea.
It is worth reading the whole article at the link.