Tag: Soviet Union

Hat tip to One Free Korea for providing this link to the Wilson Center Digital Archive. The link shows that Terenti Shtykov who was the first Soviet ambassador to North Korea, sent a cable back to Moscow that reported on Kim Il Sung’s military planning for an invasion of South Korea. The cable clearly shows the North Koreans were well equipped and ready for their June 25, 1950 invasion of South Korea which incredibly many South Korean leftists still think the South Koreans attacked the North Koreans first. You can read the translated text of the May 30, 1950 Russian cable below.

To VYSHINSKY (for the Politburo [instantsiya]).

I met with Kim Il Sung, at his request, on 29 May. At the beginning of the conversation, Kim Il Sung reported that the weapons and ammunition, which he had requested during [his] stay in Moscow, had mainly already arrived. The weapons had been transported to the newly formed divisions, and the delivery of weapons to the soldiers would be completed by 1 June. He then reported that he had gone to the new divisions and familiarized himself with the progress of military training and thinks that the divisions will be combat-ready by the end of June.

Kim Il Sung reported that, at his order, the chief of the general staff had finished the drafting of a decision in principle for an attack [nastuplenie]. The chief of the general staff reported the plan to him together with Soviet General Vasil’yev. He approved the decision, which had been made and the choice of the main blow during the attack. He asked me to meet with him, the chief of the general staff, and Soviet General Vasil’yev in order to look over this decision together. I declined such a joint meeting, referring to the fact that I would be familiarized with the decision by General Vasil’yev. 

Kim Il Sung then reported that they are finishing organizational issues in the army by 1 June. The navy is somewhat behind as a consequence of the fact that they had still not received one trawler and one large subchaser [okhotnik] from the USSR [Translator’s note: “one trawler” and “one large subchaser” are circled]. The crews for these ships have been chosen, but they are not being trained inasmuch as these ships are not available. He asked me to take appropriate measures to speed up the arrival of the ships. I replied that according to the information available to me the ships would be delivered to Korea at the beginning of June. Kim Il Sung then explained that their infantry troops were ready to conduct combat operations. Of the 10 infantry divisions, seven were already completely ready to conduct offensive operations. The tank brigade and the motorcycle regiment are also ready. Three new rifle divisions finish training in June. This suits them since they are designated for the second echelon.

[Translator’s note: there is a handwritten comment in the left margin next to the above paragraph which is partly off the reproduced page and with a line drawn to lines 3-5 of the text: “…mark…that…; still…to give…”]

He then explained that the southerners do not have complete information about the People’s Army and its combat readiness. However, they are undertaking a series of steps right now to strengthen their army, although there are no large changes in the South Korean army. Taking into consideration that the People’s Army is prepared to conduct combat operations, he would like to begin military operations against the South at the end of June. It is disadvantageous for the northerners to put off the start of combat operations further for two reasons. First, the southerners might discover their intentions and take steps to strengthen their army. Second, there might be heavy rains in July and then the attack would have to be put off until September, and this is extremely undesirable. Kim Il sung then explained that, according to a report of the chief of the general staff, they would need 16 days to concentrate the troops. Accordingly, they should begin to move the troops to the concentration area between 8 and 10 June. Kim Il Sung explained that this issue had still not been put to the members of the Party political council for discussion, and it was planned to raise this in the next few days, depending on the time for the start of operations. I avoided a direct answer to his question about the time to begin combat operations, referring to the fact that this is a serious issue and that he should consult with the military as to how much time they need to prepare the troops and with the political council, and then make a final decision.

Note:

After the conversation with Kim Il Sung about these issues I called in advisers Generals Vasil’yev and Postnikov in order to find out their opinion about the degree of readiness of the troops and the reality of the time to begin combat operations at the end of June. Generals Vasil’yev and Postnikov think that much time will be needed to concentrate the troops and for a detailed working out of the operation with the commanders of divisions and regiments, and consequently, it would be advisable to begin the operation in July. However, taking into consideration that there are heavy rains in July and that having detected preparations for combat operations, the southerners would begin to strengthen their army, they are inclined to [the view] that the preparations of the troops of the People’s Army might be concluded and the operation begun at the end of June.

My opinion.

Inasmuch as Kim Il Sung is disposed to begin the operation at the end of June and that the preparation of the troops might be concluded by this time, we might accordingly agree with this time. Kim Il Sung then reported that they and Pak Heon-yeong [Pak Hon Yong] discussed a plan of political measures, which envisions that a peaceful unification of the country is offered to the southerners. In the beginning, they were thinking of acting in the name of the Fatherland Front and then in the name of the government. He asked me to receive Pak Heon-yeong and help him draw up these documents. I agreed.

At the end of the conversation, Kim Il Sung addressed a request to take appropriate steps to speed up the delivery of the medicines ordered for the trade mission but not yet received and for delivery of 10-15,000 tons of oil in June and July. Kim Il Sung stressed that they had a serious situation with gasoline. I promised to take appropriate steps.

[Handwritten note in the Technical ?estimate? What else [[one word off the page]]”]

I support Kim Il Sung’s request for medicines, and they also have a great need for gasoline.

I request urgent instructions [be given] regarding the issues that were touched on.

You can read more at the link.

Here is an interesting historical analysis of the Chinese, Russian, and North Korean relationship during the early years of the Kim Il-sung regime.  This historical analysis does have some interesting parallels on why the Chinese government continues to support the Kim Jong-un regime today:

But for all the frustration, North Korea is an important piece on Beijing’s diplomatic board. If played incorrectly, it could backfire on China to the detriment of its bid for global leadership. Bringing Kim to his knees on behalf of the international community does nothing to advance Xi’s vision of a China-centered order in East Asia.

This is not new. Beijing has played this game before—most disastrously in 1956, when then North Korean leader Kim Il Sung brutally purged his political opponents suspected of ties to China and the Soviet Union. Moscow and Beijing intervened on their behalf, but Kim outplayed his allies with Machiavellian guile.

The crisis was also a turning point for China’s relations with North Korea. It was in 1956 that Beijing realized it had to go easy on Pyongyang, despite Kim’s maddening obstinacy, because the alternative was to surrender the country to the Soviet influence. As difficult as Kim was, he kept his distance from Moscow, and he could be an important ally in Beijing’s bid for leadership in the socialist bloc. Overnight, North Korea became an issue in China’s relationship with the Soviet Union, much as today it complicates China’s relationship with the United States.  [China File]

Here is some interesting dialogue between Chinese premier Mao Zedong and the Soviets based off of records released from the Soviet archives:

Mao agreed with Mikoyan that there were serious problems in Pyongyang. Himself a ruthless dictator, Mao claimed Kim, who “still does the Stalin thing,” appalled him. “He brooks no word of disagreement and kills all who tries to oppose him,” Mao said.

But he claimed that China had no influence on the North Koreans. “This time we have to mainly rely on you,” he told Mikoyan. “They won’t listen to China!” Mikoyan retorted that Moscow’s leverage was hardly any better, but Mao disagreed: “They won’t listen to China 100 percent of the time. They won’t listen to you 70 percent of the time.”

Mikoyan said he simply did not understand why Kim was acting this way. Mao knew why: “He is afraid that our two parties are digging under the wall [of his house].”

And Mao, sensing, rightly or wrongly, that Moscow was plotting Kim’s ouster, warned the Soviet envoy they should not try to topple him. The Chinese leader opposed the Soviet practice of overthrowing recalcitrant tyrants. Nor did he think Kim’s regime was as bad as the Soviets claimed. After all, Mao’s own regime was not exactly democratic either. If he helped bring down Kim’s house, he would set a precedent that could one day be used against him.

There was another reason for Mao’s hesitation. He was beginning to challenge Moscow for leadership in the socialist camp. He accused the Soviets of arrogance, and of trying to impose their will on other countries. Much as he feared letting Kim get away with brutalities would lead to North Korea’s collapse, he did not want the Soviets to use him as a proxy.

You look at what is happening today and you see the parallel that the Chinese do not want the Kim regime toppled and have continued to oppose attempts by the US to impose its will on other countries around the world to include North Korea.

It is worth reading the whole article at the link.

Here is an update on the search for American Korean War POWs taken to the Soviet Union:

Pentagon officials leading efforts to recover missing American service members told their Russian counterparts in May there is no evidence that U.S. prisoners of the Korean War were brought into the Soviet Union, dismissing intelligence reports and eyewitness testimony compiled over the last two decades.

American officials made the claim during a May meeting of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, and experts say it could undermine the Defense Department’s efforts to recover further information about the more than 7,800 military personnel still unaccounted for from the Korean War of the 1950s.

Michael Linnington, who until recently directed the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency, or DPAA, told Russian officials participating in the forum that the Pentagon has “no evidence” that missing troops ended up in the Soviet Union by way of China.

Linnington’s comments angered experts who say the move will signal to the Russians that the U.S. government is no longer interested in pursuing a lead that it has chased for decades.  [Free Beacon]

You can read more at the link, but there has been pretty convincing evidence shown over the years that Korean War POWs were taken to the Soviet Union for intelligence gathering of American aircraft technology.  The book American Trophies provides a detailed look at the evidence of these POWs being taken to the Soviet Union that is discussed in the rest of the article.